The New REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

VOLUME XXVIII NEW YORK, WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1921 NUMBER 362

Contents

The Week 306

Editorials

Public Opinion and the Washington Conference 309
The Outcome of the Railway Dispute..... 310
Next Comes Coal 311
Economics of the Allied Debts..... 313

General Articles

A Parting of the Ways for America, II.....
.....John Dewey 315
Tinsel and Tonnage.....Garet Garrett 318
Transplanted (Verse).....John V. A. Weaver 320
Richard Strauss.....Lawrence Gilman 321
The Chicken (Verse).....Hermann Hagedorn 323
The Irish Conference.....An English Liberal 323
A Man Goes By (Verse).....Hazel Hall 325

Reviews of Books

The Future in America.....Francis Hackett 326
Workers' Education.....Charles A. Beard 327
Two Books on London.....Lewis Mumford 328
Space, Time and Deity.....R. F. A. Hoernlé 329

The Week

LORD NORTHCLIFFE is the first Englishman of prominence who gives public evidence of understanding why Chinamen and Americans object to the existence and consequently to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. "A prolongation of the alliance," he declared in a recent interview, "only serves to irritate public and official opinion in the United States, merely humiliates China, and adds nothing to the prestige of Great Britain in Asia." Englishmen who have recognized the existence of this irritation in American opinion misunderstood its significance. They assumed that it would fade away, provided they made perfectly clear the impossibility of partnership between Great Britain and Japan in a war against the United States. But assurances of this kind do not face the major source of the dislike which Americans feel for the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Japan is the restless, disorderly and aggressive power in the Pacific. Her aggression has already mutilated and disorganized China, and if it continues it will threaten the security of free communities with coast lines on the Pacific. The Anglo-Japanese alliance permits the threat to continue. It prevents Great Britain from taking sides against Japan, and if the British Empire does not take sides against Japan Americans are afraid that nothing will check the Japanese onset except war. Hence the need of denouncing the Alliance as one condition of order and appeasement in the Far East.

MANY Americans realize the impediment which the Anglo-Japanese alliance is to the institution of order in the Far East and the limitation of naval armament. But very few understand the important part which Siberia is entitled to play in a Far East Conference and settlement. Siberia is like Australia—a European community transplanted to the Far East. Its strategic position and resources, if manipulated by an autocratic imperialist government like that of the late Tsar, are capable of being used as a grave threat to the security of China. But if its long frontier and its resources are controlled by a free government, Siberia is capable of becoming a source of security to China and an obstacle to the success of Japanese imperialism on the mainland. For this reason the American government has every reason to cultivate the friendship of Siberia and to undertake its protection in its present disorganized condition against Japan. The New Republic has hoped that the State Department would come to recognize the Far Eastern Republic and to permit it official representation in the Conference. But hitherto the Department has treated Siberia as it has treated Latvia and Esthonia. It has refused recognition. It has, however, visaed the passports of the delegates from the Chita government and that is something to the good. There will be Siberian representatives in Washington who can submit unofficial if not official facts and pleadings.

M. BRIAND, since he comes to the Washington Conference with a majority of two hundred in the Chamber of Deputies behind him, can afford to consider with less anxiety the parallel offered by President Wilson's expedition to Paris. To be sure, that majority was swelled by many who

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thought it less important that their opponent Briand should be defeated than that France should be represented at the Conference. A man who could not speak for France at the Conference would be of little use, and while there is a minority in France with whose opinions we better agree, M. Briand is, of the majority, best qualified to speak for it. It will be interesting to see how he steers the ambitions of France, for France's position in the Conference is not logically a central one.

THE repeal of the excess profits tax illustrates the effectiveness of an interested propaganda among a people who are impatient of abstract thinking. The burden of taxation, which had been borne by a small number of corporations so happily circumstanced as to receive profits above the usual level, is shifted in large part to the corporations that were receiving only modest profits. Taking from those who have not the little that they have is no new thing in taxation. The novelty in the present situation is that those who are to pay the increased burden were induced by propaganda to favor the change. No doubt they were still influenced by the exploded doctrine that the excess profits tax was a cause of high prices. As a fact, the flat corporation tax is much more likely to enter into the cost of production and exert an influence on prices. Nobody was ever forced to close down his shop or restrict his operations by the excess profits tax. Unless he made fairly generous profits he paid no tax at all. Many concerns will have to go out of business, or restrict their operations on account of the new tax, unless they can secure an increase in prices.

PRESIDENT HARDING'S scheme for the solution of the race problem in the South has much to recommend it, so far as its spirit is concerned. But how would it work, under conditions as they are in the South today? The idea of social equality, he declares, must be entirely eliminated. Racial amalgamation is a conception too intolerable to be entertained. The true solution implies equal political and economic opportunity for both races; "absolute equality in the paths of knowledge and culture." Now, there are hosts of men in the South and in the North too who would deliberately restrict the Negro's cultural and educational opportunities, with a view to keeping him in what they conceive to be his God given place as a hewer of wood and drawer of water. But this view, we believe, is receding from the minds of the intellectual leaders everywhere. The best thought of the South, as of the North, is sympathetic toward every movement for improving the economic condition of the Negro. But political equality? The South knows, as President Harding ought to know, that you can't draw a sharp line between politics and social life. The offices of a state are in most parts of America positions of social leadership. With complete political equality the state of Mississippi might easily elect a Negro as governor. Would such a result be accepted by Mississippians as devoid of social significance? The race problem unfortunately is not one that admits of easy general solutions.

HOW completely German political life has been disintegrated under foreign pressure is indicated clearly by the fact that no party or group of parties could be found to take up the responsibility resigned by Dr. Wirth. Some government there had to be, if German rights under the Silesian decision were to be protected. Therefore Dr. Wirth was forced to patch up a ministry, as a sort of receivership for the parliamentary government that had failed to function. The new government starts out with most unfavorable auspices, or more correctly with no auspices at all. Once it has completed the formal arrangements for rescuing what can be rescued out of Silesia its mandate practically lapses. It has no assurance whatever of support for any program of internal administration or legislation. And a vigorous program is needed, if head is to be made against the financial forces that are galloping Germany toward a terrible crash.

IF an appropriate occasion is needed for the release of the war-time prisoners, the opening of the Conference on Limitation of Armament should furnish it. The men sentenced under the war-acts put themselves in jeopardy primarily because of their hatred of war. Exactly the same motive brings the delegates to Washington. Moreover the delegates come from countries which have long since granted amnesty to prisoners of the type of Eugene Debs and the I. W. W.'s. To call the attention of the representatives of governments which have a more enlightened practice than our own to the plight of our war-time prisoners is a natural and obvious method of appealing to public opinion in a matter as to which the administration has been extremely derelict.

MR. LAMONT'S mission to Mexico City to confer with President Obregon and his Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. de la Huerta, in regard to the Mexican foreign loan has apparently ended in failure. This is a disappointment to every friend of President Obregon. It was hoped that he would make use of this opportunity not only to settle one of the outstanding causes of difficulty with the financial world, but also to advance relations with the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States beyond the present impasse. Negotiations in regard to the debt appear to have been broken off in consequence of the insistence of Mr. de la Huerta on the right of the Mexican government to extinguish its debt by purchasing its bonds at the market price. The bonds are depressed because of the failure to pay interest on them during the last seven years. Obviously by withholding interest and sinking fund payments the Mexican government can keep its bonds below par, and the Mexican treasury can use for redemption the very funds that should have been applied to the regular service of the debt. Such sharp practice will not advance Mexican credit in the financial world with which President Obregon must ultimately make terms. If he is acting, as is generally believed, under the prompting of Americans who have their own reasons for wishing to keep the Mexican waters troubled, it can only be reiterated that he is badly advised. On the other hand, the policy of the United States in withholding recognition until Mexico reforms herself according to our prescription is as short-sighted as it ever was.

BY a majority of approximately 4,000 North Dakota has recalled Governor Frazier and two other chief members of the administration who owed their election to the Nonpartisan League. This is evidence of the swing of public opinion back to "normalcy." During the past year the executive of North Dakota has been deadlocked by a hostile legislature; its only action was to sell the bonds previously authorized and so provide itself with funds for a continuation of its program. In the face of this success the state has recalled it. At present writing the fate of the measures proposed by the opponents of the League for the liquidation of the Bank of North Dakota and the limitation of the issues of bonds to $7,500,000 is in doubt. If they have carried, the industrial program of the state will be limited to the completion of the mill and elevator at Grand Forks; and it is doubtful if even this enterprise will remain under state management. If they have been defeated, by a whim of the electorate the Nonpartisan program will remain to be carried out by its opponents. In either case it may be safely prophesied that the experiment of a state in business on a large scale, so vigorously initiated by North Dakota, is for the present closed.

THE question as to whether the Wright brothers or Professor Langley invented the first successful aeroplane might well be left to competent scientific bodies to determine were not the good faith of the ranking American body, the Smithsonian Institution, so seriously involved. The recent lecture of Mr. Griffith Brewer, the text of which has been released by the Royal Aeronautical Society, makes out a damaging case against Mr. Glenn Curtiss and Dr. A. F. Zahm, the Smithsonian's representative. As a result of the Hammondsport tests, conducted by those two men in 1914, with what purported to be the old Langley machine, most Americans today probably believe that the credit for the invention of the aeroplane belongs to Langley. The Hammondsport machine was probably capable of flight. But that the Hammondsport machine was not the original Langley, but a modified machine in which the fundamental structural defects of the latter were eliminated, Mr. Brewer's paper proves conclusively. The action of the Smithsonian in permitting Mr. Curtiss to make the tests when his company had just been adjudged an infringer of the Wright patent, and of appointing Dr. Zahm as its representative when he was known to have been a technical expert witness for the Curtiss company in its former suits, and when he was about to represent that company in another infringement suit, certainly demands explanation.

THIS week New York will see the first birth control conference in America. We are still behind Europe, and what progress we have recently made has been largely due to the extraordinary energy and courage of Mrs. Margaret Sanger, who has found in her path every conceivable obstacle prejudice could place there. Prejudices about sex are perhaps the most violent of any, partly because they have so long lived in the dark. A visitor from some other planet would be at a loss to reconcile man's long past of victories over the chance of nature with his present inability to decide that simplest of things: how many children shall be born to him. Compared with this shrinking from knowledge and science, man's vast skill in the breeding of animals seems indeed absurd.

IT is good news that the Anti-Lynching Bill (H. R. 13) sponsored by Representative Dyer of Missouri, has been revised and approved by the Attorney-General, and reported out favorably by the House Committee on the Judiciary. The bill is justly severe. It threatens any state or municipal officer who neglects to guard any person in his protection from death at the hands of a mob with a heavy fine and imprisonment up to five years. It promises an imprisonment from five years to life for any one taking part in a lynching. Perhaps the most effective clause of the bill is the one which makes any county in which a lynching takes place liable to a federal fine of ten thousand dollars. The purse hurts sooner than the conscience.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Public Opinion and the Washington Conference

THE Conference on the Limitation of Armaments will meet on November 12th in a shifty and dangerous but not unwholesome atmosphere of public opinion. For the moment the uppermost sentiment about the gathering is not unfavorable. The popular voice credits the administration with good intentions, with trustworthy knowledge of its chosen field of action and with an intelligent specific program. But this sympathetic attitude is subject to many quick and anxious misgivings. The more alert and articulate part of public opinion hoards a vivid recollection of the gross discrepancy between the brave promise and the ignoble performance of the Paris Conference. These people combine a timid and almost tremulous expectancy with a large lively fund of latent apprehension and suspicion. In spite of a superficial show of optimism and approval they do not anticipate very much from the Conference. They rather expect failure, often for widely different reasons, and in so far as it fails they propose, if they can, to give the statesmen responsible for the failure a poor time.

This prevailing atmosphere of public opinion, shifty, disillusioned and exacting as it is, is more alert and wholesome than the atmosphere of public opinion which surrounded the Paris Conference. In the winter and spring of 1918-1919 both the popular and official mind throughout the world was shot through with illusions. There was the illusion of the Wilson liberals, who attributed to Mr. Wilson's war speeches and to his peace program an authority and a practical momentum which, as the event proved, they were far from possessing. There was the illusion of the romantic revolutionists, who believed that the distresses and the destructions of the war had prepared other peoples as well as the Russians for an experiment in communism, and who confidently anticipated the westward march of Bolshevism over the burning ruins of the old social order. Finally, there was the illusion of the reactionaries. As they saw it, the world, as it had conducted itself in 1914, was the best of all possible worlds, and they proposed in relation both to domestic and foreign affairs to carry it back as quickly and as thoroughly as they could.

This third group was much more powerful than either of its two competitors. It dictated and approved the Treaty of Versailles, and then triumphantly returned home to restore as quickly as it could the pre-war domestic political and social conditions. It prided itself, as the Pan-Germans did, on being most realistic, but it was suffering from an illusion as gross and palpable as that either of the Wilson liberals or the revolutionary socialists—the illusion that "normalcy" in 1924 after the economic and social precipitations of the war could resemble the "normalcy" of 1914.

The existence and the prevalence of these illusions prevented the betrayal in Paris from being used as an opportunity to demonstrate the power of public opinion. If the liberals throughout the world had united in denouncing the Treaty of Versailles as a breach of faith and as an unworkable instrument they would have immediately undermined its credit and vindicated the vitality of their convictions. Instead the majority of them compromised with the Treaty as good enough. By proving that their own convictions possessed small authority over their own minds, they justified, after the event, the action of the authors of the Treaty in treating liberal principles as if they were not true. But little by little the Treaty which they had refused to discredit increasingly discredited itself. The society of nations which it instituted was a society in which the ultimate arbiter was still force and in which conflicts between classes and between peoples were ultimately inevitable. But recent history indicates that this kind of social organization, however reactionaries may believe in it and liberals connive at it, does not work as well as it did. The common people in Europe and America were tired and sick of force and of the social fruits which were derived from the dependence on force. It is proved in many instances—in Russia, in Ireland and on the Rhine—that it is becoming impossible to organize force on a scale which was sufficient to sustain legislation such as that of Versailles.

Because common decent people are sick of the futility and the atrocities of force they are returning to the idea of deliberation and conference—the idea which gave form to the League of Nations but which the Treaty of Peace repudiated. They are conferring in London in the attempt to base the government of Ireland on consent. They are about to confer in Washington chiefly for the purpose of substituting in the Far East a concert of nations for a tyranny of power. This Washington Conference can hardly fail as flagrantly as the Paris Conference failed. Although the reactionaries are still in control, they are not as self-confident and as resolute as they were in 1919. They no longer propose the restoration of the status quo ante as the only sane and realistic course for a statesman to adopt. In spite of their victory over liberal opinion three years ago, they are curiously enough more afraid of it now than they were then. They recognize that the liberal program in foreign affairs which Mr. Wilson preached so eloquently from 1916 to 1918 has received a completer vin-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dication from the course of events than it did from the loyalty of its advocates. They are prepared to make considerable concessions towards substituting the reign of conference for the reign of force, provided they feel behind them the pressure of a public opinion which is too insistent to be denied and too well informed to be fooled.

The failure in Paris was proportioned to the mixture of credulity, cynicism, illusion, pugnacity and infirmity with which the prolonged war had infected public opinion among both vanquished and victor. The success in Washington, if success it proves to be, will be proportioned to the amount of fertility which peace, adversity, disillusionment and post-war experience have restored to public opinion. A conference about vital questions of foreign policy is not a meeting of plenipotentiaries for the purpose of adopting binding and irrevocable decisions. It is an agency of deliberation even more than an agency of action; and the value of its deliberations will depend upon the extent to which they are communicated to the public and the ability of the public to understand what they mean. A credulous, impatient or infirm public opinion can convert a reasonably successful conference into a failure by misinterpreting the behavior of the conferees. An alert, patient, well-informed and convinced public opinion can convert a largely unsuccessful conference into a comparative success by placing a truthful interpretation upon the work of the conferees—by discriminating, that is, between the success and the failure, by enabling the success to live and by insisting on the recognition and the repudiation of the failure. A false interpretation may pervert and neutralize the more successful work of the successful conference. A truthful interpretation may redeem the less successful work of the unsuccessful conference by preparing the way at the next assembly for a more illuminating deliberation and a more statesmanlike action. All intelligent American citizens are as unmistakably, if not as abundantly, responsible for the success of the Conference as is President Harding or Secretary Hughes. Let them look to their own responsibilities first.

The Outcome of the Railway Dispute

ONLY in Utopia could a serious controversy be settled in such a manner as to please everybody. In our imperfect world the best index of the fairness of a settlement is that nobody is thoroughly pleased. So far as we know, no one is wholly pleased with the arrangements under which the threatened railway strike was abandoned. Railway labor must smart somewhat under the consciousness that the public at large feels that the employers, backed by the government, called the bluff of the organizations. The companies must regret that they were deprived of the best chance of crushing the unions that is likely to come in a decade. And the general public is left in uncertainty as to how long the peace will last. The struggle between the companies and the unions has been postponed, and that is something. But whether the time thus won will be used for the working out of a permanent settlement, or in preparation for more desperate war, is a question on which the mind of the average citizen is far from clear.

One thing is certain, and that is that the prestige of the Railroad Labor Board has been greatly improved. It has been the fashion to say that the Board lacked the power to enforce its decisions. And in fact, it has appeared in the past unable to enforce them as against the railway companies. But in the recent controversy the companies have been at great pains to identify the decisions of the Board with the government itself. Their organs have dinned it into the public's ears that in striking against a decision of the Board the unions were fighting, not the companies, but the government. That was extremely potent propaganda, and would have helped materially to break the strike if it had gone into effect. But we think that in employing this form of propaganda the employers may have overreached themselves. The unions were striking nominally against the decision of the Board of July 1st reducing wages, but as everyone knows their real purpose was to prevent the further reduction in wages threatened by the companies. They have now been assured by the Board that no such reduction will be permitted until all the complexities of the working rules controversy have been straightened out. And this work, says the memorandum of the Board, "requires an immense amount of time and patience." This means, and it was meant to mean, that for many months no further cuts in wages can be made without flouting the authority of the Railroad Labor Board. The companies have convinced the public that the acts of the Board are acts of government, binding on all good citizens. Very well: the companies will have to abide by them. They can not have the face to cut wages and trust to the lack of teeth in the transportation act.

The unions backed down, but got about all they could have got by a strike. The companies were vindicated in their contention that the proposed strike was unlawful, but will find that with respect to further wage cutting they have tied themselves up in knots of legality and public opinion. In the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

meantime the pressure for reduced railway rates continues unabated. Here again the companies will find their propaganda reacting to their disadvantage. For in their defence of their proposed cut in wages they argued that the interests of the community demanded lower rates. Instead of repeating their traditional formula that freight rates are almost a vanishing element in the cost of most finished goods, they threw their authority on the side of those who contend that railway rates must be reduced if the cost of living is to come down and if the movement of production is to be quickened. That argument is just as valid whether the cost of reduced rates is to come out of railway wages or out of railway profits. The public is convinced, and may be expected to insist vigorously on a reduction in rates.

But the companies will argue that they can not reduce rates enough to relieve industry and remain solvent. That is probably true, as matters stand. If our present industrial distress were due solely to excessive railway rates there might be fair ground for believing that a reduction in rates would increase the volume of traffic sufficiently to maintain railway income at its present level, or even to increase it. But the causes of depression are much more complicated than that. Any practicable reduction in rates would cost the railways money, probably without greatly stimulating industry. It is only fair, to be sure, to reduce rates somewhat, to correspond with the wages cut of last July. But the gain from such a reduction would be moral, rather than material. It would fix the principle that railway capital and railway labor must share the cost of bringing rates back to the normal level.

Real progress toward the traditional American level of low rates is not to be made, however, by any scheme of sharing of losses, impartial or otherwise. It will have to come, in the end, through increased efficiency. In so far as the efficiency of the roads is impaired through cumbersome working rules, relief may be expected from the revision of rules now occupying the Railroad Labor Board. But does anyone expect such revision to put the railways on their feet again? Certainly the railway managers cherish no such expectation. The probability is that the burden of the existing rules has been greatly exaggerated, for propaganda purposes. We shall have to look elsewhere for substantial economies in transportation.

And that means that we shall have to look to the organization and management of the railways themselves. It is incredible that the transportation service of a rich and populous country can not be organized in such a way as to pay living wages and living profits without charging rates that kill business. It may not pay now, but what is to be expected, so long as competition is permitted or even enforced where cooperation is indicated by the very nature of the service? England took advantage of her war time control of the railways to impose upon the companies the obligation of reorganizing into systems adapted to the economic need of the country. We abandoned our war control to the status quo ante. It was an act of collective laziness for which we are paying the penalty in railway companies at the verge of bankruptcy and constantly on the lookout for opportunities to sweat an additional percentage off the wages of labor, even at the risk of a strike involving unimaginable hardship for the whole community.

We have for the present escaped the disasters of a railway strike, thanks to the energy of the Railroad Labor Board and the good sense of the railway unions. Do we mean to sit idly by, waiting for the Board to get through with its present tasks so that the wages question may be taken up and exactly the same problem may confront us, in exactly the same form? Or shall we have the intelligence to work out a solution of the transportation problem as a whole? The situation is one which offers a final test of the economic statecraft of the party which now holds full control of our government.

Next Comes Coal

PERHAPS the American public is not as anxious to avoid industrial conflict as it professes to be. Measures to avert the disasters of an open conflict cannot safely be left to the time when the clash is imminent. In the coal industry, as has just happened in the transportation industry, influences that are making for another great industrial show of force are allowed to run their course amid public apathy and ignorance. For two years now we have been setting the stage in the coal industry for the precipitation of problems, industrial and legal, private and public, which can be met only by an administration and a public opinion prepared to meet them. Reduction of armament in industry is as real a problem now as reduction of armament among the armed nations of the world. The time to have our disarmament conference for the coal industry is right now, before the time for peaceful discussion shall have passed.

The past two years in the coal industry have not been lacking in danger signals. The transition from public to private control, with the disappearance of the Fuel Administration, was bound to give rise to scores of issues which could be amicably adjusted only through the medium of inform-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ed discussion. The first break came with the widespread strike of coal miners in 1919. The famous Indianapolis Injunction settled the strike in such a way as to engender more mutual suspicion and distrust. A relationship already difficult was made thereby even more difficult. The apparent peace in the strike areas was then followed by the outbreaks in West Virginia, culminating in the march of armed miners and their dispersal by federal troops only a few months ago. Already the West Virginia Operators have announced to the Senate investigating committee their refusal to accept the terms of an agreement proposed by the representatives of the United Mine Workers, for the reason that they will not become parties to negotiation of any kind with a trade union of organized miners. At the present writing it seems unlikely that any constructive proposals leading to satisfactory peace in West Virginia will come out of Washington. To make matters still worse, even union operators in West Virginia have signified their intention not to renew their contracts with the union, which expire at the end of March, 1922. And all the while, the United Mine Workers, the national union of coal miners, is facing a decision from the United States Supreme Court in the Coronado case, which, if it is adverse to the union, will rock the very foundations of organized labor in that industry as they have never been rocked before.

In large measure responsible for this series of events and for the consequences they entail are the presence in the coal mining industry of a substantial area of non-union mines and the hope of many union operators that this area can be extended. On the union's side this growth of non-unionism is regarded as a menace to basic working standards in the mines and will be resisted with every resource at its command. Nor are the fears of the union in this respect groundless. The industrial depression and the precipitous fall in the demand for bituminous coal presented to non-union operators just the opportunity they needed. When the price of coal was rising neither union nor non-union operators could have been successful in any policy of extensive wage-cutting. Once the slack set in, however, conditions changed so as to make possible the cutting of prices and wages by non-union operators. The total demand for coal was small. Every reduction in price, no matter how slight, meant the diversion of purchasers from one market to another. The wage contracts between the union and the union operators prevented the latter from reducing wages. The non-union operators, not bound by any such contracts, were able, consequently, to cut both wages and prices; and within a short time to enlarge their business at the expense of the union operators. This leaves the union operators at the present time impatient at the restraints imposed upon them by the union contracts and insistent in their demands for immediate and drastic wage cuts. On both sides threats of strike or lockout are common enough to be indicative of the actual sentiment in the industry.

From the standpoint of public policy, the issues now engaging the attention of the union and of the operators are reasonably clear. Surrender to the non-union group of operators means relinquishing labor standards and establishing a competitive level in which the determining factors in business success are ability to control and exploit labor and not efficiency in management. The major effort of the trade union, in this as in other industries, has been exerted to prevent labor conditions from remaining the foot ball in the game of business competition. Where the trade union has succeeded in this effort, business men have been forced to seek differential advantages over their competitors in improved management and organization and not in lower labor standards. Unfortunately in the coal industry the policy persists of attempting to maintain a so-called balance of power in which the power of the union is always to be held in check by the activities of the non-union operators. This policy is fundamentally unsound and has been found to be so on more occasions than one. Wherever the union in part of the industry is strong, adherence to this policy leads to constant conflict in the unorganized districts, to instability in the organized, and in general to an industrial situation in which plans for combatting the growth of unions are foremost in the minds of industrial leaders while the task of making the industry perform its service for the country becomes necessarily a secondary matter. In short, as long as trade unions must fight for mere recognition, consideration of a sound labor-employer relation is indefinitely postponed.

Industrial relations in the coal industry, moreover, are much complicated by reason of the public nature of the industry. Interruption to mining, like interruption to transportation service, may become in a short time a public calamity. For this reason the coal industry has been subjected from time to time to a scrutiny which has invariably revealed industrial disease of the extreme type. Underemployment on a magnificent scale, the reckless exhaustion of an invaluable natural resource, enormous wastes of one type or another in production and distribution, are a few symptoms of the disease which practically every investigation of the industry has brought to light. Proposed legis-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lation in Congress designed merely to force the collection of the pertinent facts about the industry has thus far not been adopted. When, therefore, negotiation over the renewal of the agreements between the operators and union is begun next spring, the union will be confronted with a thriving non-union industry developed under the aegis of the law, with the absence of any public policy of control over the industry for public benefit, and possibly with a Supreme Court decision which may undo all the union has accomplished in the past. Plain justice to the miners and common sense make it imperative that the few months before April 1, 1922, be devoted to an informed discussion of the problems of the American coal industry. Only by means of such a discussion can the impending controversy between the operators and the miners be kept from degenerating into another debate over wage rates and wage levels, when the country's concern is with the problems that lie at the bottom of the industry's present difficulty with wages.

Economics of the Allied Debts

SHALL the claims of the American government upon the Allied powers be pressed, postponed or remitted? That is essentially a question of international politics. We made the loans not with the purpose of investing our national surplus—for we had no surplus to spare, and if we had had a surplus, the Allied powers would not at the time have offered a promising field of investment—but with the purpose of promoting what we regarded as the supreme political interests of the nation. Even if we had believed that the borrowing nations would never repay the loans, we could not have refused to extend them such aid as we judged necessary to keep them in the field against the common enemy. And sooner or later we shall find ourselves compelled to decide, on broad considerations of international politics, just what we mean to do about the loans. Our handling of the loans will go far toward determining what sort of world we shall live in. We can use them to promote international harmony and economic reconstruction, or to push the world farther on the road to economic and political disintegration.

But before we make up our minds as to the political uses of the debts, it will be worth our while to consider how much the Allied debts are worth to us, as economic assets. There is a naive view, not so widely held now as two years ago, that the debts are worth exactly their face value, provided the debtor nations are solvent; that the ten billions due us may properly be set against an equal amount of our national debt; that we can use the interest on the loans in relief of taxation, or to pay a soldiers' bonus, or pensions, or what not. The defect of this view is that it ignores completely the mechanism by which debts between nations must be paid. This can not be simply a cash transaction as between individuals. The debtor nations have practically no gold to spare, and we already have more gold than we need. If the debts are paid, they will have to be paid in goods, exported by the debtor nations either to the United States, or to countries whose credits will be acceptable to the United States. And such credits will be acceptable only if they issue in goods sooner or later to be exported to the United States.

Repayment of the debts can mean nothing else but the importation into the United States of a volume of goods representing a value, over and above any duties we may levy, equal to interest and amortization on the debt. Let us put the amount at six hundred millions a year; it could not be less than that. Six hundred millions of imports unbalanced by any exports at all! We wonder that protectionists like Mr. Harding and Mr. Fordney have been willing to contemplate such a situation for a moment. The magnitude of the transaction is sufficient to give concern even to the free trader whose economic thinking is realistic enough to take into account the delicate balance of conflicting interests in a state organized economically on a basis of private enterprise. A communistic state would welcome the prospect of a steady flow of imports in return for which nothing need be sent out of the country. Lenin no doubt would accept with deepest gratitude our claims upon England, France and Italy, if we wished to present them to him. He could easily manage to distribute the goods in such a way as to confer happiness upon the recipients without inflicting distress upon anybody. That is something we could not possibly do. Whether it is because our system is superior to Lenin's or inferior to it, there is no way in which we could accept payment of the sums due us without injuring some of our citizens while helping others.

It may be said that other countries have managed to survive a condition economically the same as this. Before the war England had about twenty billion dollars invested abroad, on which she managed to take interest every year in the shape of imports unbalanced by exports. But the British investments had been distributed throughout the world so gradually that British economic life had had time to readjust itself to them. Among the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

readjustments made was the partial abandonment of domestic agriculture, to make room for the immense quantities of imported foodstuffs and raw materials that represented the payment of interest on the investment. If we were willing to abandon wheat growing to Canada, wool growing to Australia, sugar growing to the West Indies, we should provide England with a means for paying part of her debt, at least. She could supply the producers of wheat, wool and sugar with manufactures, taking in return their products for shipment to the United States.

But there are two difficulties with this solution. The first is that our producers of wheat and wool and sugar do not mean to yield the market to imports, and the second is that our own manufacturers are building up an export trade in Canada, Australia and the West Indies, and do not mean to yield the field to British exporters. We shall have to look to some other solution, then. Why not try the simplest of all, that of accepting the payment of the debt in the form of manufactured goods? It is the simplest, because England, France and Italy have nothing to send us directly but the products of industry.

There would be no difficulty about accepting a modest volume of industrial products. Our market is so capacious that it could absorb some hundreds of millions of additional imports without consequences disastrous to domestic industry. But the payment of the Allied debts would represent an enormous volume of industrial products. The export of industrial products would not be limited by the amount of payments on the debts, or six hundred millions a year. For England, France and Italy could not simply take $600,000,000 out of their existing annual production and make it over to us. They have no such surplus to spare. Nor can they make such a volume of products out of their own raw materials. They would have to import materials and food for their factory workers, paying for them in manufactures. In effect, they would have only their margin of profit, figured in goods, to pay us.

It is impossible to estimate how great an increase in Allied industrial production would be required to pay off the debt. It would have to be more than $600,000,000, probably three or four times that amount. But the total world trade in manufacturing exports was less than seven billions before the war; it can hardly be more than that now, in spite of inflated prices. This means that exacting payment of the Allied debts would involve a very notable increase in the pressure for industrial markets throughout the world. Those who look forward to a great expansion in American industrial exports will find it worth while to give careful consideration to this condition of affairs.

It is a condition, moreover, that is aggravated by the indemnity pressure upon Germany. Even dismissing the third class of Germany's obligation, she is now formally bound to pay at least $500,000,000, and as soon as she exports enough to pay that, her obligation will be increased by 50 to 100 percent, if not more. If it could be arranged so that Germany's exports satisfied the claims upon England, France and Italy there would not necessarily be a very great increase in the export pressure on that score. But no such arrangement is in sight, nor does it appear indeed to be practicable. German export pressure promises to add itself to Allied pressure. If the promise is realized, all neutral markets will be removed from American reach. We can sell or refuse to sell; but Germany and the Allies will have to sell, if they are to meet their obligations to us. They will perforce undersell us.

The Allied debts appear to be a doubtful asset, from the point of view of our national economy. Should we then remit them? Whatever the political aspects of the situation, there is a cogent economic argument for remitting them, provided a real relief of export pressure can be thus secured. No such relief will materialize if the German indemnity situation remains unchanged. But if in return for the remission of Allied debts the Allies would relieve Germany of such obligations as can not be paid directly to the Allies, as under the Loucheur-Rathenau arrangement, the export industries of the world could be put once more on a sound basis. America would profit more from that, in the long run, than from any payments she may receive from the Allies.

The New
REPUBLIC
A Journal of Opinion

PUBLISHED WEEKLY AND COPYRIGHT, 1921, IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY THE REPUBLIC PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., 421 WEST TWENTY-FIRST STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. HERBERT CROLY, PRESIDENT; ROBERT HALLOWELL, TREASURER; DANIEL MEBANE, CIRCULATION MANAGER.

EDITORS

HERBERT CROLY ALVIN JOHNSON
FRANCIS HACKETT ROBERT MORSS LOVETT
PHILIP LITTELL

YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION FIFTY-TWO ISSUES, FIVE DOLLARS IN ADVANCE. SINGLE COPIES FIFTEEN CENTS. CANADIAN SUBSCRIPTION FIVE DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE. FOREIGN SUBSCRIPTIONS, FOR COUNTRIES IN THE POSTAL UNION, SIX DOLLARS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE; REMITTANCE TO BE MADE BY INTERNATIONAL POSTAL MONEY ORDER.

ENTERED AS SECOND CLASS MATTER, NOVEMBER 6, 1914, AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N. Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Parting of the Ways for America

II

THAT the Chinese people, generally speaking, has a less antagonistic feeling towards the United States than towards other powers seems to me an undoubted fact. The feeling has been disturbed at divers times by the treatment of the Chinese upon the Pacific coast, by the exclusion act, by the turning over of our interest in the building of the Peking-Canton (or Hankow) railway to a European group, by the Lansing-Ishii agreement, and finally by the part played by President Wilson in the Versailles decision regarding Shantung. Those disturbances in the main, however, have made them dubious as to our skill, energy and intelligence rather than as to our goodwill. Americans, taken individually and collectively, are to the Chinese—at least such was my impression—a rather simple folk, taking the word in its good and its deprecatory sense. In noting the Chinese reaction to the proposed Pacific Conference, it was interesting to see the combination of an almost unlimited hope that the United States was to lead in protecting them from further aggressions and in rectifying existing evils, with a lack of confidence, a fear that the United States would have something put over on it.

Friendly feeling is, of course, mainly based upon a negative fact, the fact that the United States has taken no part in "leasing" territories, establishing spheres and setting up extra-national post-offices. On the positive side stands the contribution made by Americans to education, especially medical and that of girls and women, and to philanthropy and relief. Politically, there are the early service of Burlingame, the open door policy of John Hay (though failure to maintain it in fact while securing signatures to it on paper has a great deal to do with the Chinese belief in our defective energy) and the part played by the United States in moderating the terms of the settlement of the Boxer outbreak, in addition to a considerable number of minor helpful acts. China also remembers that we were the only nation to take exception to the treaties embodying the Twenty-one Demands. While our exception was chiefly made on the basis of our own interests which these treaties might injuriously affect, a sentiment exists that the protest was a pledge of assistance to China when the time should be opportune for raising the whole question. And without doubt the reservation made on May 16, 1915, by our State Department is a strong card at the forthcoming Conference if the Department wishes to play it.

From the American standpoint, the open door principle represents one of the only two established principles of American diplomacy, the other being, of course, the Monroe Doctrine. In connection with sentimental or idealistic associations which have clustered about it, it constitutes us in some vague fashion, in both Chinese and American public opinion, a sort of guardian or at least spokesman of the interests of China in relation to foreign powers. Although, as was pointed out in a former article, the open door policy directly concerns other nations in their relation to China rather than China herself, yet the violation of the policy by other powers has been so frequent and so much to the detriment of China, that American interest, prestige and moral sentiment are now implicated in such an enforcement of it as will redound to the advantage of China.

Citizens of other countries are often irritated by a suggestion of such a relationship between the United States and China. It presents itself as a proclamation of superior national virtue under cover of which the United States aims to establish its influence in China at the expense of other countries. The irritation is exasperated by the fact that the situation as it stands is an undoubted economic and political asset of the United States in China. We may concede without argument any contention that the situation is not due to superior virtue but rather to contingencies of history and geography—in which respect it is not unlike many things that pass for virtues with individuals. The contention may be admitted without controversy because it is not pertinent to the main issue. The question is not so much how the state of affairs came about as what it now is, how it is to be treated and what consequences are to flow from it. It is a fact that up to the present the intelligent self-interest of America has coincided with the interests of a stable, independent and progressive China. It is also a fact that American traditions and sentiments have gathered about this consideration so that now there is widespread conviction in the American people of moral obligations of assistance and friendly protection owed by us to China. At present, no policy can be entered upon that does not bear the semblance of fairness and goodwill. We have at least so much

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

protection against the dangers discussed in the prior article.

Among Americans in China and presumably at home there is a strong feeling that we should adopt stronger and more positive policies for the future than we have maintained in the past. This feeling seems to me fraught with dangers unless we make very clear to ourselves in just what respects we are to continue and make good our traditional policy in a more positive manner. To some extent our past policy has been one of drifting. Radical change in this respect may go further than appears upon the surface in altering other fundamental aspects of our policy. What is condemned as drifting is in effect largely the same thing that is also praised as non-interference. A detailed settled policy, no matter how "constructive" it may appear to be, can hardly help involving us in the domestic policies of China, an affair of factions and a game which the Chinese understand and play much better than any foreigners. Such an involvement would at once lessen a present large asset in China, aloofness from internal intrigues and struggles.

The specific protests of Chinese in this country —mainly Cantonese—against the Consortium seem to me mainly based on misapprehension. But their *general* attitude of opposition nevertheless conveys an important lesson. It is based on a belief that the effect of the Consortium will be to give the Peking government a factitious advantage in the internal conflict which is waging in China, so that to all intents and purposes it will mark a taking of sides on our part. It is well remembered that the effect of the "reorganization" loan of the prior Consortium—in which the United States was *not* a partner—was to give Yuan Shi Kai the funds which seated him, and the militarist faction after him, firmly in the governmental saddle. Viewing the matter from a larger point of view than that of Canton vs. Peking, the most fundamental objection I heard brought by Chinese against the Consortium was in effect as follows: The republican revolution in China has still to be wrought out; the beginning of ten years ago has been arrested. It remains to fight it out. The inevitable effect of increased foreign financial and economic interest in China, even admitting that its industrial effect was advantageous to China, would be to create an interest in *stabilizing* China politically, which in effect would mean to sanctify the status quo, and prevent the development of a revolution which cannot be accomplished without internal disorders that would affect foreign investments unfavorably. These considerations are not mentioned for the sake of throwing light on the Consortium: they are cited as an illustration of the probability that a too positive and constructive development of our tradition of goodwill to China would involve us in an interference with Chinese domestic affairs injurious to China's welfare, to that free and independent development in which we profess such interest.

But how, it will be asked, are we to protect China from foreign depredations, particularly those of Japan, how are we to change our nominal goodwill into a reality, if we do not enter upon much more positive and detailed policies? If there was in existence at the present time any such thing as a diplomacy of peoples as distinct from a diplomacy of governments, the question would mean something quite different from what it now means. As things now stand the people should profoundly distrust the *politicians'* love for China. It is too frequently the reverse side of fear and incipient hatred of Japan, colored perhaps by anti-British feeling.

There should be no disguising of the situation. The aggressive activities of other nations in China, centring but not exhausted at this time in Japan, are not merely sources of trouble to China but they are potential causes of trouble in our own international relationships. We are committed by our tradition and by the present actualities of the situation to attempt something positive for China as respects her international status. To live up to our responsibility is a most difficult and delicate matter. We have on the one side to avoid getting entangled in quasi-imperialistic European policies in Asia, whether under the guise of altruism, of putting ourselves in a position where we can exercise a more effective supervision of their behavior, or by means of economic expansion. On the other side, we have to avoid drifting into that kind of covert or avowed antagonism to European and Japanese imperialism which will only increase friction, encourage a combination especially of Great Britain and Japan—or of France and Japan—against us, and bring war appreciably nearer.

We need to bear in mind that China will not be saved from outside herself. Even if by a successful war we should relieve China from Japanese encroachments, from all encroachments, China would not of necessity be brought nearer her legitimate goal of orderly and prosperous internal development. Apart from the question of how far war can now settle any fundamental issues without begetting others as dangerous, there is the fact that China of all countries is the one where settlement by force, especially by outside force, is least applicable and most likely to be enormously dis-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

serviceable. China is used to taking time for her problems: she can neither understand nor profit by the impatient methods of the western world which are profoundly alien to her genius. Moreover, a civilization which is on a continental scale, which is so old that the rest of us are parvenus in comparison, which is thick and closely woven, cannot be hurried in its development without disaster. Transformation from within is its sole way out, and we can best help China by trying to see to it that she gets the time she needs in order to effect this transformation, whether or not we like the particular form it assumes at any particular time.

A successful war in behalf of China would leave untouched her problems of education, of factional and sectional forces, of political immaturity showing itself in present incapacity for organization. It would affect her industrial growth undoubtedly, but in all human probability for the worse, increasing the likelihood that she would enter upon an industrialization which would repeat the worst evils of western industrial life without the immunities, resistances and remedial measures which the west has evolved. The imagination cannot conceive a worse crime than fastening western industrialism upon China before she has developed within herself the means of coping with the forces which it would release. The danger is great enough as it is. War waged in China's behalf by western powers and western methods would make the danger practically irresistible. In addition we should gain a permanent interest in China which is likely to be of the most dangerous character to ourselves. If we were not committed by it to future imperialism, we should be luckier than we have any right to hope to be.

These remarks are negative and vague as to our future course. They imply a confession of lack of such wisdom as would enable me to make positive definite proposals. But at least I have confidence in the wisdom and goodwill of the American and other peoples to deal with the problem, if they are only called into action. And the first condition of calling wisdom and goodwill into effective existence is to recognize the seriousness of the problem and the utter futility of trying to force its solution by impatient and hurried methods. Pro-Japanese apologetics is dangerous; it obscures the realities of the situation. An irritated anti-Japanism that would hasten the solution of the Chinese problem merely by attacking Japan is equally fatal to discovering and applying a proper method.

More specifically and also more generically, proper publicity is the greatest need. If, as Secretary Hughes has intimated, a settlement of the problems of the Pacific is made a condition of arriving at an agreement regarding reduction and limitation of armaments, it is likely that the Conference might better never be held. In eagerness to do something which will pass as a settlement, either China's—and Siberia's—interests will be sacrificed in some unfair compromise, or irritation and friction will be increased—and in the end so will armaments. In any literal sense, it is ridiculous to suppose that the problems of the Pacific can be settled in a few weeks, or months—or years. Yet the discussion of the problems, in separation from the question of armament, may be of great use. For it may further that publicity which is a precondition of any genuine settlement. This involves public diplomacy. But it also involves a wider publicity, one which will enlighten the world about the facts of Asia, internal and international.

Scepticism about Foreign Offices, as they are at present conducted, is justified. But scepticism about the power of public opinion, if it can be aroused and instructed, to reshape Foreign Office policies means hopelessness about the future of the world. Let everything possible be done to reduce armament, if only to secure a naval holiday on the part of the three great naval powers, and if only for the sake of lessening taxation. Let the Conference on Problems devote itself to discussing and making known as fully and widely as possible the element and scope of those problems, and the fears —or should one call them hopes?—of the cynics will be frustrated. It is not so important that a decision in the American sense of the Yap question be finally and forever arrived at, as it is that the need of China and the Orient in general for freer and fuller communications with the rest of the world be made clear—and so on, down or up the list of agenda. The commercial open door is needed. But the need is greater that the door be opened to light, to knowledge and understanding. If these forces will not create a public opinion which will in time secure a lasting and just settlement of other problems, there is no recourse save despair of civilization. Liberals can do something better than predicting failure and impugning motives. They can work for the opened door of open diplomacy, of continuous and intelligent inquiry, of discussion free from propaganda. To shirk this responsibility on the alleged ground that economic imperialism and organized greed will surely bring the Conference to failure is supine and snobbish. It is one of the factors that may count in leading the United States to take the wrong course in the parting of the ways.

JOHN DEWEY.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Tinsel and Tonnage

THE reason why conferences on unemployment are so futile always is that the disease is treated as a kind of king's evil and touched in the same superstitious way. Nothing appears to have been learned about it since one Jacob S. Coxey, thirty years ago, proposed that the idle be hired to build roads out of public funds.

Meanwhile a popular theology has crystallized around the blind god that rules all this modern affair. This god is an idea. Its name is Economic Necessity.

The orthodox explanations of the present universal stagnation in trade are mainly these:

1. Destruction of capital in war.
2. Enormous accumulation of exportable goods against a reopening of foreign markets, followed by the discovery that in many of those foreign markets there was no effective demand.
3. Sudden reaction from war-time extravagance, private and public.
4. Deflation of war money.
5. Chaotic condition of foreign exchange.
6. General confusion of values in the economic transition from war to peace.
7. Buyers' strike.

This is the received theology. It is taught by the government, expounded by the Department of Labor and very earnestly believed by all those who a year ago were calling upon labor to forget itself and produce, produce! produce!! to save the world from a famine of goods. Will it bear the weight of doubt?

It is true that an enormous amount of capital was destroyed in war; it is also true that during the war new capital was marvellously created in the form of increased industrial capacity, so that in this country certainly, and in most other countries probably, the potential means of producing wealth are greater than ever before. If you speak of the destruction of capital as a cause of unemployment you are bound to mean that in consequence of such destruction men are left without tools, or lack raw materials upon which to bestow their labor, or perhaps are wanting both, and are therefore unable to support themselves. But if that is what you mean you cannot logically in your next explanation ascribe the stagnation of trade and unemployment to an accumulation of unsaleable goods, that is to say, exchangeable wealth. For that means that there is a surplus of things which can have been produced only by the use of capital. And you do not save your logic by adding that the unsaleableness of these things is owing to the absence of an effective demand. For if you say that, you are obliged to admit that the demand is ineffective because everybody has something to sell before he can buy, which brings you back again to the idea of a surplus and leaves you in the dilemma of having accounted for unemployment by (a) a destruction of capital and (b) a surplus of goods produced by capital.

Two of the most dangerous problems present in the world are how the surplus industrial countries, meaning countries that have a surplus of manufactures to export, may amicably divide among themselves the great absorbing markets of Asia and at the same time protect their own internal markets from the competition of each other's surplus products. And those surplus countries, mark you, are principally the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany and Japan. And if it occurs to you that the need to export a surplus of manufactures is in order that food may be imported, that certainly is not true of the United States.

You will notice that all orthodox explanations of this present epidemic of unemployment refer it to the war. That is a refuge. The war was an aggravation. But widespread unemployment is a periodic economic evil of our time, no more to be ascribed to war in its essential aspect than extravagance, greed, folly or religious ecstasy. We have had inflation, reaction, stagnation in trade and acute universal unemployment through the whole industrialized world without any war, without any accumulation of goods against a reopening of foreign markets after the war, without any chaos in foreign exchange,—not once but several times within the memory of the generation.

In America there is no lack of capital, if you mean plant, equipment and raw materials. It is notorious that we are over-equipped. There is no lack of money, if you mean to say money is capital, for we have vaults overflowing with idle gold. Here clearly the trouble is a surplus of goods and an excess capacity for production. We have more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than we can use for ourselves and a greater surplus than we can sell abroad.

Under those conditions may one imagine converting more than plenty into leisure, into a kind of economic holiday? Is that open to consideration? No. That isn't feasible. If you tried any such thing you would succeed only in converting a trade depression into a panic.

No. The practical problem is how to restore buying to its *nth* power. Demand,—effective demand,—is the magic herb. If people will only buy more things,—buy heavily, optimistically, buy now instead of later, the ruinous surplus will be wiped out and labor can be reemployed.

But what is it people are buying too little of? News of unemployment is printed in papers bursting with advertisements of "gold filled vanity cases, Thursday only, $7.50"; of "choice baby fisher skins, which will be mounted to individual order, for scarfs, at the unusually low price of $175 to $250 each"; of baby Packards, very cheap, at less than $3,000 each, the demand for which is astonishing to the manufacturers.

The number of unemployed, strictly speaking, is between three and a half and four millions. Yet people this year are spending three and a half to four billions of dollars for pleasure cars,—pleasure cars alone,—and that is $1,000 per capita of the unemployed. Low-priced cars are selling best. The popular expenditure of three and a half to four billions a year for pleasure cars is an extravagance that could not have been imagined a few years ago. Shall it be diminished? In the name of necessity, no. The motor industry, like every other, is running slack. Its capacity is more than enough to meet this demand. If people bought fewer pleasure cars there would be more unemployment in the motor plant, in the steel mills, in the tire factories, in the transportation industry, in a thousand places you would never think of. It is better, in fact highly desirable, that they should buy more,—more of everything, even vanity cases and baby fisher skins. Why? Why, for the sake of business. Employment depends on the state of business,—not this or that, but all business. Whoop up business and unemployment will disappear.

Now the light deepens. We begin dimly to perceive the nature of our task on earth. It is to support a progressive increase of business. Sisyphus, condemned forever to roll a stone uphill without advancing it, is the perfect symbol. Business is our stone. To keep it from rolling back and crushing us requires all our strength. Yet if the goal be ease from labor or the leisure of plenty we advance toward it not at all. Inventions, labor saving devices, all improvements in the means of producing wealth, are instantly absorbed by this stone. They serve only to increase business. And the task of supporting business is increased in the same ratio.

What is the one certainty in respect of these three and a half or four million unemployed? It is that while we continue to spend three and a half to four billions a year for pleasure cars and while it pays to advertise two-hundred-dollar scarfs in forty-page daily newspapers, not one of them will starve or freeze. A case of actual starvation in this country is almost unknown; a case of death by exposure is news. By some slight diversion of the stream of sustenance the unemployed will be somehow taken care of until business can be increased again.

What does this mean? It means that there is more than enough labor,—much more than enough,—to provide everybody with food, warmth, comfort and a reasonable amount of entertainment. The surplus of labor above the amount required for these purposes is absorbed in the production of those surfeits and superfluities, that mass of strictly unnecessary things, for which business increasingly induces a demand. A surplus of pleasure cars is of no use to the unemployed. A pleasure car cannot be worn on the back or eaten or lived in through the winter. But if people who can will buy more pleasure cars there will be jobs for the unemployed and they may live again by their own labor. There is positively no way in which labor, having produced a surplus of unnecessary things, may thereby take its leisure. The only remedy anybody can imagine is to increase the demand for those things, first in order that the surplus may be used up and then that labor may be employed to make more of them.

It does not matter what these things are. If there were a vogue for blowing soap bubbles and if a machine were invented to blow them with, factories for making such machines would rise, and you would have a soap bubble machine making industry, capitalized, employing thousands of workers, consuming great quantities of raw material. You cannot imagine anything more wasteful. But suppose that suddenly the vogue for blowing soap bubbles fails or that people in a fit of sanity begin to economize by not buying soap bubble machines. What happens? The soap bubble machine industry is crippled. The factories close. There is unemployment. The mills that have supplied the raw material lay off men. There is less freight for the railroads. Business suffers. What is the remedy? Restore the demand for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

soap bubble machines and all those unemployed are employed again.

Does this seem fantastic? Well, it is hardly more fantastic than the sight of a talking machine, full size mahogany cabinet, style Louis XIV, $250, instalment plan, in the two room cottage of a family of five supported by odd jobs and washing. That you may see. And while people were buying things in that extravagant manner, business was exceedingly good and wages were rising.

And yet, why? Why does business spend so many millions in advertising, in propaganda, in sheer selling effort, to create by suggestion wants that did not exist before? Why does it continually and increasingly capitalize the production and sale of unnecessary things? Why does so much business consist is selling goods and services that people may easily do without?

The answer is that it must. The number of people who live by business increases wonderfully. It increases relatively. Business grows faster than anything else. In the last half century the number of people engaged in agriculture has increased hardly as fast as the population. The number engaged in manufacturing, notwithstanding the enormous multiplication of manufactures, has increased less than one would guess,—say, one and a half times faster than the population. The explanation there is that by means, methods and machinery the productivity per unit of labor has risen. But the number of people engaged in trading and transportation has increased two and a half times faster than the population. That represents business. Clerks and salesmen have increased six or seven times faster than the population. Banks and brokers have increased six or seven times faster.

To support its own, that is, to sustain the increasing number of people who crowd into it and live by it, business must extend itself faster and faster by a law of progression. It extends itself rationally so far as it can, then irrationally or by any means, from necessity, and ends by inducing an artificial, whimsical demand for a great variety of things that are necessary neither to the comfort of the flesh nor the saving of the soul, useful only to the vanity. Such demand is easily deranged. People discover how much they can do without and business in dismay talks of a buyers' strike. The making of non-essential things is perforce abated. Labor begins to be disemployed. And the economic structure, so delicately and reciprocally ramified that the difference between one hundred and one hundred and fifty yards on the spool of thread is six hundred cars of railroad freight in a year, is shocked at the top. If the slump in the use and production of unnecessary things is serious all business will be affected, first that in less non-essential things, then that in desirable things and finally that in necessary things all the way down to the base, with cumulative unemployment and a progressive loss in the purchasing power of labor.

The moral is as you take it. In its ultimate aspect it is not a question of economics really. It is one of living values. What are we living for?

Business tends to enthrall us utterly. Where it is going nobody knows. Like every other pulsating thing its instinct is to make itself universal. Its ways are blind. Though its consequences are social it has no social sense of its own. Yet for many ingenious comforts, for the New York sky line, for the dynamic rise of human wants, for the velocity, the color, the general handiness and the splendid vulgarity of modern existence, we are heavily indebted to it. Periodic unemployment is part of its price and pertains to its pride in waste.

GARET GARRETT.

Transplanted

Well, sure, I know Paw kicked at comin' here
  Into the city with us when Maw died,
But how could one pore, lonely, weak old man
  Keep up a farm, no matter how he tried?

So it was only sense; and for a time,
  Say for about a year, things wasn't bad;
But then, this Spring he seems to kinda fail,
  And putters round at night, restless and sad.

And when I ast him what could be the matter,
  He mumbles somethin' about "trees" and "grass,"
And "air that you can breathe," and "God! these walls!"
  And "City streets where two can't hardly pass."

So then I get some little boxes made,
  Filled up with dirt; and give Paw some sweet peas,
And some nasturshians, and some mornin'-glories,
  And then he was as happy as you please

Watchin' the sprouts come up, and stretchin' strings
  So's they could climb, and tendin' 'em every day;
But just as they was gettin' fairly started
  A big storm come and washed the dirt away.

Well, Paw he acted like his heart was broke,
  And moped around, and only shook his head
When anybody talked; and now, since August
  He ain't but twicet got up out of his bed.

The other night he stands there in the door—
  It sounds so cracked I almost hate to tell it—
And says, like to his self, "Them ain't the stars!
  That's clover up there! Why! I most can smell it! . . . .

JOHN V. A. WEAVER.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Richard Strauss

THE works of Strauss came to us first at a time when the classics of nineteenth century music were still on probation among the cautious. Many godfearing critics and musicians were not yet wholly at their ease in the company of Wagner's paphian chromatics; Brahms was alive; and some among the Elders of criticism had barely stopped wondering in public whether or not their æsthetic principles would allow them to accept the Ninth Symphony of Beethoven. It seems incredible, yet it is cold historic fact. Les jeunes of today, patronizing Debussy as almost invisibly ante-bellum and eying Wagner with a freezing stare of non-recognition, are a vivid symbol of the evanescence of musical novelty. Newness fades with curious rapidity out of any combination of tones. That baffling quality which we are content to call its "modernity"—that thrilling and sharply definite thing which is the special possession of music among the arts—is forever blurring and dimming like the vanishing contours of a photographic film exposed to the light. The traditional sanctions of music are scarcely three centuries old: it is, as we keep pathetically reminding ourselves, "the youngest of the arts." Yet watch it as it withers and stales while we are still upbraiding it for its wild ways and its brazen disrespect for the Past.

It is necessary to bear in mind this extraordinary tendency of music to age and fade if we would realize the effect of Strauss's impact upon the concert-rooms of the later 'nineties. Into that restricted and airless milieu those early symphonic poems intruded with somewhat the effect of a meteor in a hall-bedroom. Recall, if you can, the smug timidities of the musical 'nineties—which could tolerate the epic sensuousness of Wagner only as a tonal pill sugared with the sublimely fatuous aesthetics of the old medicine-man of Bayreuth; and imagine, again if you can, the startling effect of the electricity with which the air was charged by the release of Strauss's dazzling music, with its swift and magnetic intensities and its fearless handling of the problem that music had faced long before Matthew Arnold was born—how to function unsparingly as "a criticism of life" and still remain music.

In one of those revelations of almost lyric insight which occasionally strike through Mr. Bernard Shaw's glittering surfaces, you will come upon this sentence: "After the symphonies of Beethoven it was certain that the poetry which lies too deep for words does not lie too deep for music, and that the vicissitudes of the soul . . . can make symphonies without the aid of dance-tunes."

The vicissitudes of the soul are recorded everywhere in the music of the nineteenth century, from Beethoven to . . . Ethelbert Nevin. Strauss taught his generation a new way of approaching the problem of making music articulate. He showed them how to do two seemingly contradictory things: to expand and to concentrate it. He applied it to an immensely widened range of human experience. He seemed to touch life with generous daring, and at every side—at its loveliest and gravest, at its most disordered and crass and ill-favored. He had learned how to convey essential experience still drenched in its proper colors, pungent with its veritable odors, rich with all its implications. He concerned himself only occasionally with the romantic abstractions of his predecessors. The anguish and disillusionment of Wagner's Mark, of his Wotan, marvellously affecting though they are, remain simply heroic symbols of humanity's immemorial pain. The bitter grief that cries from the music that Strauss has written to describe Don Quixote's homeward ride after his last defeat belongs to a wholly different order of musical expression. It is sharply individualized and concrete—a piece of portraiture, amazingly and profoundly veracious, the transcript of a human personality at a definite moment of intense experience: the heart-broken, pitiable, disillusioned Knight on his plodding horse, forever done with chivalry and dreams, emerges from the orchestral canvas. Unlike Beethoven in his Coriolanus, Wagner in his music-dramas, Liszt and Tchaikovsky in their symphonic tone-painting, Strauss was little concerned with the voicing of elemental emotions through heroic prototypes. It was not Grief or Desire that engrossed him, but Don Quixote's grief, Don Juan's desire.

That this preference, this preoccupation, invited him to a kind of psychological exploration and projection that music had neither compassed nor attempted, was a fact which he perceived almost from the start. It is true that he indulged in some symbolistic musical statuary; but his Heldenleben and Tod und Verklärung and Zarathustra, magnificent though they are as musical patterns, do not contain the essence of his genius as do the less generalized, more concrete and specific works of which Till Eulenspiegel, Don Juan, and Don Quixote are the incomparable instances.

But you cannot faithfully render the Rabelaisian humors and rich grotesquerie of a subject like Till Eulenspiegel, or suggest the disorganization of poor Don Quixote's brain-cells, or convey the blended pathos and irony of the scene wherein he mistakes a flock of sheep for the advancing host of the Emperor Alifonfaron, without affront-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing those who would keep music ever "tripping in the rear of Romance." And Strauss, by his headlong and unsparing audacities, became at once a prodigious offence in the sight of the orthodox, a prodigious exhilaration to the responsive. Describing Till Eulenspiegel, James Huneker (though he was of the few who understood and loved it) exclaimed that "such a picture has never been hung in the august halls of music. It offends". . . But it is much more important to remember that Till and its fellows delighted, enthralled, and heartened the young revoltés of their day. To the musical youth of the late 'nineties and the opening years of the new century, Strauss was an intrepid liberator marching under a splendid banner of revolt. "Music," they cried, "has been too long in the laboratories of the wise men. To free it from its Egyptian bondage, to make it the tongue of all life"—that was their spokesman's welcoming shout to Strauss across the decorous lawns of the Romantics as he came superbly over the hill. They greeted him as "a psychological realist in symphonic art," a master of characterization, of a new tonal speech.

And what an enthralling art he exerted!—with its Elizabethan gusto and abundance, its splendor of imagery, its singular blend of precision and amplitude, its wit and fervor, its way of turning, by beautifully modulated processes, from comedy as veraciously mundane and gross as his portrayal of Sancho Panza, to the noble tenderness of Don Quixote's death-scene.

Its path-breaking audacity seemed staggering when the century was young. Even the most devoted gasped a little when they heard him, in the final pages of Also Sprach Zarathustra, setting two opposing tonalities—B major and C major—in juxtaposition, without regard for the etiquette of modulation. "To the orthodox," remarked Mr. Huneker, "his avoidance of the normal, the facile, the smug, the unoriginal, is a crime against ethics." He was indeed, as they called him then, the Mad Mullah of harmony; and those who guarded sleeplessly the ashes of their fathers and the temples of their gods, raged and wept over his tonal blasphemies. He was demented, or a charlatan, or a degenerate; he was leading music down a path which ended in the madhouse or the morgue; and they denied him any trace of inspiration. Remembering Macaulay on Moore's Life of Byron, they swore that his wings were ostrich wings—that he could run, but not soar.

But les jeunes adored him, and marched with songs and shouts behind him. They perceived him as the wind of a new art, sweeping the old fixed stars of music out of the academic heavens; or as an apocalyptic trumpet-voice that called to them, "Come up hither, and I will show thee things which must be hereafter." Whereupon the orthodox retorted that he was no summoning trumpet-voice, but the star called Wormwood, which had fallen into the pure streams of music and was causing men to die of the waters because they were made bitter; or they shuddered before him—the more deeply terrified—as at the menace of the horned and seven-headed dragon.

But this was in the old, old far-off days. Strauss the man is not yet sixty; but Strauss the poet in tones has tragically aged. His music can no longer run or leap or dance or march; and, in the mournful phrase of Mr. Pater, the eyelids are a little weary. Two things have happened to Strauss: he has been the victim of that rapidity of musical evolution which he once exemplified in his own art; and he has ceased to distinguish between the things that are worth saying and the things that are not. We are aware of the first catastrophe because we perceive that his old audacities have been made to seem unreal. Things in his music that once had so exciting a quality of defiant daring, that once were incandescent and crepitating, now seem dulled or extinguished. Something has blurred the edges and flattened the saliencies of his music. His place as the sharpest gadfly of modern music has been usurped by other and more formidable tormentors of the complacent—by the contemporary musical rebels of Italy, Russia, France, Austria, England: by Malipiero, Casella, Stravinsky, Schönberg, Goossens. Today the international woods are full of musical trouble-makers beside whom Strauss appears as law-abiding and unprovocative as the Flatbush Chamber of Commerce. Even in that work wherein he seemed to his antagonists most horrendous and epileptic, the once terrible Elektra, he would probably today do no more than recall to them that description by a witness in a poisoning case, quoted by William James, in reply to a question as to how the victim looked: "Pleasant-like and foaming at the mouth."

Man, said Nietzsche, is something that shall be surpassed; and Strauss, who worships Nietzsche, is doubtless resigned to his own participation in that process. But the significant fact about his later works—those which succeeded the astonishing scores that tower across the post-Wagnerian generation, from the Macbeth of 1886 to the Elektra of 1909—is that this recent music of his, the Alpine Symphony, Ariadne auf Naxos, The Legend of Joseph, much of Der Rosenkavalier, is not the essential Strauss at all. One discounts the inevitable disappearance of the old impression of daring, of novel and significant

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

things uttered with ease and mastery and eloquence. What is really lamentable is the absence from this later music of those traits that still live for us in the great works of his prime. Those wonderful earlier scores, Don Juan, Till Eulenspiegel, Zarathustra, Ein Heldenleben, Don Quixote, Elektra, are, it is true, marred by lapses and excrescences—by the sentimental cantilenas, the beer-garden idealisms, the dreary buffooneries, that Strauss could never wholly deny himself; except, perhaps, in his one perfect masterpiece, Don Quixote. But did not Beethoven and Brahms and other Olympians palter and drowse; have they not bequeathed to us both dreariness and platitude? In those incomparable works of Strauss's young maturity, the strength and beauty and distinction are enormously in excess of that which is banal and formularized and inexpensive. There, at his best, he spoke, as Luther said of Paul, "pure flame." For example, there is nothing in all music that reaches closer to sublimity than the picture of sunrise that opens Zarathustra: music which seems to have captured something supermundane, something blazing and tremendous, out of the heavens and disclosed it "on the earth in the sight of men."

Involuntarily, one speaks of his virtues in the past tense. "He was. . . . He had. . . ." Yet, however he may now disappoint and dishearten us, we still possess him essentially unimpaired. Nothing has gone out of his Don Quixote, out of the finest pages of his Heldenleben and Don Juan, except that which they could most easily spare—their emotion of surprise. The freedom and swift energy, the beauty that often overwhelms, the individual voice, the compassionate awareness of human life and the unequalled power of conveying it with sensibility and truth and power—these remain and prevail.

LAWRENCE GILMAN.

The Chicken

You see a languid river flowing down
Through opulent valleys to a rainbow town;
And on a barge on silks and pillows sighing
You see your indolent, soft body lying,
With maids that flatter as they comb your gold,
  And waiters that bring birds on golden dishes,
While your white fingers, long and slim and cold,
  Dip in a bowl and toy with golden fishes.

I see a hallroom with a squeaking jet,
And last year's clothes, and broken plumes, and debt;
And raucous tongues and lifted brows and jeers
And howling emptiness, and years and years;
The day a hell of dreams and obscene hoping,
  The dark a dead world, where a cursing soul
Sits at a window with cold fingers groping
  Vainly for goldfish in an empty bowl.

HERMANN HAGEDORN.

The Irish Conference

MR. DE VALERA in one of his interchanges with Mr. Lloyd George affirmed that the proposed Irish conference must be unhampered by anything except "the facts," a phrase which he afterwards amended to "the facts as we know them." This was thought by some to be a significant addition, for Mr. Lloyd George had in the meantime strongly reasserted that conference was useless and impossible except on the basis that Ireland must remain within the Empire, and therefore this sine qua non, we said to ourselves, was surely one of "the facts as Mr. de Valera knew them" when he sent his reply. But about these facts, what are they? So far after nearly three months of talking, begun by three private conferences between Mr. de Valera and the British Premier, the protagonists have got no farther than a statement of their own view of their respective positions. Is it possible in any even moderately impartial way to look a little into the conference and record "the facts as we know them"—the exhibits, so to speak, that are set out on the conference table?

But first, it may be asked, is there any clear opinion in England about the prospects of the conference? Certainly; there are clear opinions. But unfortunately there are two. One of them holds that inasmuch as it is a notorious and fundamental fact that England will not accede to separation, Sinn Fein are not "fools enough" to have gone into conference except with the idea of compromise; further that, compromise being admitted in principle, it can and will ultimately be obtained in detail, even if the details give infinite trouble and sometimes actually occasion breakdown.

The other side affirm that nothing can come of the conference because Sinn Fein mean separation all the time and will be satisfied with nothing else. Asked for their evidence, these people point to the consistent and unchanging utterances of de Valera, and especially to his recent declaration to the Dail, in rejecting the British offer, that the claim to independence was the rock on which he stood and, forsaking which, he was inevitably lost. They cite also the defiant utterances of sundry Irish irreconcilables, saying that the compromisers, even if they desired, could not deliver the goods. Asked then to state the motives which in their opinion led Sinn Fein into a conference which they know will be barren, they say that Sinn Fein had at all costs to avoid putting themselves in the wrong with public opinion. So had Mr. George, and on this reading of the situation it was quite certain that after the proposal for a conference had been dangled sufficiently long before the public each side would have to come in for fear lest the other should saddle it with the odium of torpedoing the conference. But this statement, though in itself perfectly accurate, only proves that Sinn Fein would in any event have had to come in; it does not prove that they have actually come in without any intention of modifying their claim to independence.

Then some say that Sinn Fein welcomed the truce in order to organize for a fresh and greater war. It is, of course, common talk in Dublin that if the conference breaks down Sinn Fein will "conscript" their followers, though one would suppose that from the purely Irish point of view regular warfare would be the least profitable tactics and guerrilla warfare the most profitable against the British army. But it is true that Sinn Fein are training their men openly and that the Sinn Fein parts of Ulster are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

preparing, if necessary, to revolt against the Northern Parliament, which means civil war, imperial intervention and the rest. These things are true, but they throw no light on the sincerity of Sinn Fein in entering the conference or on the demands or offers which Sinn Fein intend to make. The critical reader may ask whether Dublin Castle and the War Office on their side are not making elaborate military preparations all this time, exactly like Sinn Fein, against the contingency of a conference breakdown. I can only say that they certainly ought to be, but that in this country we have not so high an opinion of the foresightedness of our War Office and of Dublin Castle as some people have abroad. What is certain is that sundry highly placed officials, both civil and military, in Dublin are intent on bringing the conference to a successful issue and that officials from Dublin Castle are going about Ireland urging on the Crown forces of all kinds the importance of observing the truce.

There are, by the way, two schools of thought in England about the events that are likely immediately to follow a final breakdown of the conference. (I say "final" because temporary breaks are not only possible but probable.) One school, which will never face up to the worst in human nature, affirms that after the blood-bath of the last year neither side in Ireland will go back, or be permitted by public opinion to go back, to the horrors of guerrilla warfare. I believe this to be fallacious about the principals in the struggle, who will, further, allay public opinion sufficiently by demonstrating, each of them, that the other side was the aggressor and must bear all responsibility for the rupture and its consequences. The view of the other school is that war will at once be resumed in an intensified form. Rumor in Dublin adds that Sinn Fein will signalize the end of the truce—if indeed they allow the period of notice to run out—by some drastic coup. What sort of coup, you ask. Details unknown, naturally, but gloating rumor adds that the signing of the truce was just in time to stop a wholesale battue of Crown forces up and down the Dublin streets.

But while it is suggested that Sinn Fein expected nothing from the conference, but only entered it because they must and in order to complete their military preparations, it is also said that they knew they had little to fear. Their full argument, according to those pessimists who hope nothing from the conference, would run something like this: "We shall stand out for independence and nothing less. The conference will break down, but the British government will not be able to renew the war upon us, having once abandoned it and having thereby admitted both the defeat of its policy of coercion and the justice of public criticism at home and abroad. The British government will have to evacuate the west and south of Ireland, at the most retaining its forces only at a few points on the coast. But lest we are mistaken and lest the British Ministers who continually threaten us with force should mean what they say and not be merely bluffing, we will make ready in Ireland, especially as the failure to settle may well mean civil war in the north and we shall have to intervene." Some Ministers, of course, and some papers in England have been threatening force, but the Morning Post, which demands a "strong soldier like General Maxwell," has been for force all along. It represents Toryism unregenerated by the Coalition—the sort of thing, be it noted, that the Tory party would accept and adopt as its own policy if the Coalition were dissolved. Mr. Churchill, too, said the other day that "real war, not mere bush-ranging" will follow an unabated demand for separation. But then Mr. Churchill always thinks in terms of force; it is his idea of assisting peace negotiations. As a whole, Ministers have refrained from flourishing the big stick before Sinn Fein. Most of them, I should say, are anxious that the choice between evacuation and the big stick may never be put to them.

I have given the views that are held about the prospects of the conference and the motives of the two sides at length because it helps to an understanding of the complex conditions under which the negotiations are proceeding. It is of course difficult to analyze the precise calculations of the two sides. If one could do that, if one could penetrate accurately to what each is thinking and intending, the conference would soon be over, one way or the other. But there is one thing that an Englishman, I think, must include in any statement of the "facts" and that is the sincerity of the British government in proposing a conference and seeking a settlement on lines which would, in effect, give Ireland her freedom. This is a fundamental point and I notice that Mr. Lincoln Colcord, writing in an American weekly review the other day, took the view that the real motive of the British government in seeking a settlement was economic, being due to the stress and strain of our financial position, just like the British "enthusiasm for naval disarmament." It is an unhappy parallel, because there is in England no "enthusiasm for naval disarmament" and indeed little public interest in it. But the statement of the motives for the government's Irish policy is inaccurate and unjust and I doubt whether even Sinn Fein believe it, though some of them are said to set great stock by the coming bankruptcy (as they foresee it) of the British Exchequer. The government's policy of Thorough had been a complete failure; they were subjected to very heavy and damaging criticism; they attached great importance to opinion in the United States; they had set up the Northern Parliament and so established Ulster firmly in her fortress; and they had to face the prospect of the whole of Ireland outside four counties being in a state of frank rebellion. Small wonder if, in spite of all that they had said, they made a last effort to secure a settlement by negotiation. The economic situation may have counted a little but only a little. It was the bitter realities of the whole position, of which finance is only one and not a most important aspect, that drove them at last to make their offer.

If Sinn Fein mean to stand on de Valera's "rock" we shall soon know. England will not consent to separation. She might whittle down some of the Six Conditions. The fiscal clause, binding Ireland to Free Trade, would go first. It is conceivable that almost anything might ultimately go for the sake of peace except the provisions that guarantee naval security to the United Kingdom. Those will remain paramount and unalterable. I know all that may be said about the right of self-determination and the German doctrine of "necessity" in respect of Belgium. But this article is only concerned with facts and not with morals. The natives of this island—it cannot be said too often—regard the faintest breath of danger to their security at sea with an instant and unsleeping jealousy. No ridicule or censure will persuade them that an independent Ireland which boasts its inability to forget seven centuries of wrongs from England might not be a danger to England in another war. Lord Richard Cavendish Bentinck, a friend of Ireland, said the other day that if Ireland were independent she would be in more danger of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an attack from England than England would be of attack from her. That is certainly true, I think, and it constitutes the reason why if Ireland were thinking only of security she would choose rather to be within the Empire than without it.

But assuming that Sinn Fein are prepared to assent to some genuine form of association with the communties of the British Empire, the difficulties begin. Is it to be Dominion status? But what is "Dominion status"? Surely, it may be said, the status that the Dominions enjoy. But in practice or in theory? In practice obviously. Then how set it down in words, since the practice is much more liberal than the theory and the most marked characteristic of Dominion liberties is that they are gradually but steadily broadening all the time. Begin tomorrow to set down in words the precise powers and rights that Canada or Australia in form and theory possess and it will be found that they are appreciably narrower than those which they actually exert. So it would be with Ireland. An instrument according her Dominion status would give her less than the Dominions actually enjoy. There is, for instance, the imperial veto, which can in theory be imposed on so much of Dominion legislation. But it is not so imposed. When, a good many years ago now, the Home government threatened to veto an indemnity bill passed by the Natal Legislature after a Zulu rising, the Natal government protested openly to the Dominions and the veto was withdrawn. I doubt whether there has been any instance of its application since that significant episode. But in theory the power remains and, as it is stipulated in the case of the Dominions, so it would be stipulated in the case of Ireland. The fear of the Irish, and a reasonable one, would be that whereas Canada or Australia, being both powerful and distant, are allowed continually to enlarge without protest their constitutional rights, Ireland, being both weak and dangerously near, would always be held by the threat of superior force to the letter of the bond or to less even than that. This difficulty is hardly touched by General Smuts's suggestion, otherwise most valuable, that Ireland would have the protection of the other Dominions at the table of the Imperial Conference. That protection might be a safeguard to her but it does not solve the difficulty of conferring on her by diplomatic instrument a Dominion status that should be as full of liberty as that which the Dominions actually enjoy. In one respect that degree of liberty is not concedable. The Dominions have not the "right" to secede but if they chose to do so—Canada for instance—England neither could nor would prevent them. Ireland she both could and would. No formal definition of Dominion status can include fundamental truths of that description.

If not Dominion status, is there a chance for "dual sovereignty?" Ireland might again be ruled by its own King, Lords and Commons as it was once before. This is the solution that put an end to the long controversies between Denmark and Iceland, which now has a sovereign of its own in the person of the Danish King. It would relieve Sinn Fein of the feeling which irks them, as it does the Hertzog party in South Africa, that under Dominion status they are more closely bound up with the business of the Empire, and it might provide a way of escape from the difficulties of definition. Of course, sovereignty itself would need definition and as Irish sovereignty there would be restrictions on its powers. Everything that was done in Ireland would be done by the King of Ireland on the advice of his Ministers, but foreign policy and naval defence would be the affair, in practice, of the King of the United Kingdom. It may easily be that this solution, which would give Ireland, formally at least, a greater constitutional self-sufficiency, may appeal to Sinn Fein more than any other that is practicable.

Provided, of course, the Irish are willing to make concessions. That is the mystery of the conference. Mr. Bernard Shaw says that the young Irish, the I. R. A., are convinced that they have beaten the British army and can do so again. They fear that anything which the British government grants to them now it may afterwards set about to withdraw. But that danger will not be exorcised by obtaining more than the British government or people are willing, in spirit and in truth, to give. To obtain all would be to risk all. One cannot believe that the demand for independence will be the last word of Sinn Fein at the conference. De Valera has insisted that the delegates have no existence or authority except as the chosen representatives of an independent Ireland. As such they go to the conference. As such also they can submit to a vote of their constituents the terms of any settlement on which they agree with the British government, even if it be less than independence. But what about Ulster? It is strange that in all these months next to nothing has been heard about the Ulster problem. De Valera says that Sinn Fein will not coerce Ulster, but Sinn Fein demands an undivided Ireland, and Ireland is divided with Ulster possessing a Parliament of its own and imperial protection. Is it possible that Sinn Fein would take less than independence if they have the prospect of drawing Ulster some day in a united Ireland—say by a provision for a periodical plebiscite of the Ulster counties separately? County option is the democratic, and the only democratic, solution of the Ulster difficulty. It was included in Mr. Asquith's scheme in 1914, but it was ejected by Unionist and Orange influence from the existing act. If now Sinn Fein demands its revival—which is at least a possibility—where would lie the obstacle? Not in the Liberal side of the coalition, certainly. Not in the Unionist side, probably, though there might be a dissentient minority. But in Ulster—yes. And there, when everything has been said about English wickedness, one touches the rock-bottom of this sea of trouble.

AN ENGLISH LIBERAL.

A Man Goes By

Where his sure feet pass
The crowds are strangely thinned—
They are the furrowed grass
And he is the wind.

Many go with the thought
Of their footfall's little beat,
Wearing their own lives caught
Like shackles on their feet.

But he is disinterested
In feet and their fevered way;
There is motive in his tread
That was not shaped from clay.

Thresholds may make him small,
But the wind is in his feet—
Dominant, impersonal—
As he walks upon a street.

HAZEL HALL.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Future in America

The Future in America, by H. G. Wells. New York: Harper and Bros. New Printing. $2.25.

IT is extraordinarily interesting at this moment to pick up The Future in America. When H. G. Wells published it in 1906, fifteen years ago, he was forty years old. He had then written only two novels—Kipps, and Love and Mr. Lewisham. He classified as "romances" the nine cosmological tales with which he had started out—The Time Machine, The War of the Worlds and so on. In the way of "sociological essays," as he entitled them, he had written Anticipations, Mankind in the Making and A Modern Utopia. Still before him were New Worlds for Old, First and Last Things, Tono-Bungay, The New Machiavelli, Joan and Peter, the history, Mr. Polly. . . . He was still tentative, modest, deprecatory. He could be symbolized by his still somewhat wild and straggling moustache. He spoke of his "poor superficialities" as contrasted with the livid frankness of Sir William Butler, of all people! He was, he murmured, an exploratory ant assailing the American elephant. He was, last humbleness of all, a literary man. At the Oneida factory he was "full of that respect that a literary man must needs feel when a creative business controller displays his quality." And there were aspects of the American scene that made him quiver with sensibility. He noted "base-looking" people. He could not see the bloody spectacle of the stockyards. "I hate stenches, and I have an immense repugnance to the killing of fixed and helpless animals." He shivered at Chicago. "Chicago is one hoarse cry for discipline! The reek and scandal of the stockyards is really only a gigantic form of that same quality in American life that, in a minor aspect, makes the sidewalk filthy."

But with not a few differences in his mood at that time, with more self-criticism and perhaps more emotional accessibility, The Future in America is still definitely one of the first of those sweeping perceptions that H. G. Wells has framed for the social and political benefit of his contemporaries. He came to America with his own philosophy, undoubtedly—the outcome of socialist idealism crossed on English utilitarianism. But the incidents of that philosophy were by no means so arresting as the mere fact of its striking and quick-witted application to America, a land about which few principled observers have ever succeeded in being philosophical.

He saw America whole. Recording its high accents in a narrative that moved tellingly and smoothly from end to end, he contrived that those accents should give emphasis to the purpose upon which he was engaged. That purpose was, at bottom, intensely practical. It sprang from the fact that he saw the world as primarily a machine, a machine that was distraught because of "individualism," that in turn interfered with individualism and would always do so until it was governed by mind. He saw America sprawling wildly and helplessly over its magnificent continent, and he begged for it this aristocratic superintendence of mind.

"For a time I forgot my questionings; I sincerely believed, 'These people can do anything,' and, now I have it all in perspective, I have to confess that doubt has taken me again. 'These people,' I say, 'might do anything. They are the finest people upon earth—the most hopeful. But they are vain and hasty; they are thoughtless, harsh and undisciplined. In the end, it may be, they will accomplish nothing.'" What is needed, he added, is a focussing both moral and intellectual. It is "to resolve a confusion of purposes, traditions, habits, into a common ordered intention."

This insistence on intention, "a common ordered intention," has, it seems to me, one serious psychological limitation. It has the defect of not dealing with the source of consent, the feeling of the individual. But, even if Mr. Wells's philosophy has fundamentally had something of this defect, has usually failed to reconcile the need of "a common ordered intention" with the fine and intricate problem of securing the individual, and has therefore resorted in the end to a division between things of the state and "personal motives . . . and entertaining intimate things"—even if this is the case, which one can only suggest in passing, the picture of America is not thereby impaired so much as the interpretation; and in The Future in America the picture is brilliant.

Reading it again I realize how astonishingly vivid were H. G. Wells's characterizations. He talked with Roosevelt: his phrase, "the friendly peering snarl of his face, like a man with the sun in his eyes," is nothing less than perfect. His chapter on the Negroes is not only flooded with real feeling, but is implacably honest—and exhibits practically no chance of a "common ordered intention." His interpretation of the cruelty of America to MacQueen and Gorky is not sufficiently ramified, but his account of their treatment is at once bitingly clear and finely tactful and humane. His refusal to fall in with the current attitude toward the predatory rich is also a good example of real poise. His picture of W. W. Astor—"Mr. Astor, for all that he draws blood from New York as effectually as a ferret draws blood from a rabbit, is indeed the most innocent of men"—is a proper companion to his picture of John D. Rockefeller. "Mr. J. D. Rockefeller's mild, thin-lipped, pleasant face gives the lie to all such melodramatic nonsense." And his portrait of Hinky-Dink is also memorable. He went behind the counter in Hinky-Dink's saloon. The crowd, "I should think they were Americanized immigrants. I looked across the counter at them, met their eyes, got the quality of their faces, and it struck me I was a very flimsy and unsubstantial, intellectual thing indeed. It seemed to me that I would as soon go to live in a pen in a stockyard as into American politics."

Boston, at the other end of the scale, received incomparable characterization. "To so casual and adventurous a person as myself, indeed, Boston presents a terrible, a terrifying unanimity of aesthetic discriminations." The Winged Victory, Botticelli, the Princess—did he really spot those unassisted?

Patently in the light of his purpose he saw Niagara, and proclaimed that turbines were more beautiful than waterfalls. He waved the splendors of the mountains aside, and sunrise and sunset, in order to see "ordered and equipped and proud and beautiful humanity." He went to Ellis Island and shook his head at the crude material that was pouring in—Russian Jews, South Italians, Ruthenians. He shook his head no less at the emptiness of mind in Washington, the hideousness of child labor, the rampant haste and disorder of commercial competition. There's no such thing, he cried, as honest trading, "no natural line at which legitimate bargaining ends and cheating begins." And his mind swiftly turned from this perception, from the jostle and squalor with which commercialism choked the American scene, to a vision "of white

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

marble and spotless surfaces and a shining order, of everything wider, taller, cleaner, better. . . ."

Into this glistening, tiled channel of purpose, so like a lavatory in design, the stream of H. G. Wells's American impressions was made to flow. "What is going to happen to the United States of America in the next thirty years or so?" When he asked this question he already had in mind the World State which is now his dominant social idea. He had in mind the probability of Germany's war with England. But he did not precisely foresee America's share in what might grandiloquently be called the problem of the world.

"For all the Philippine adventure," he said of America, "her future still seems to lie on the whole compactly in one continent, and not as ours is, dispersed round and about the habitable globe, strangely entangled with India, with Japan, with Africa and with the great antagonism the Germans force upon us at our doors."

Since that description was written the United States has, in fact, abandoned the domestic description of "United States" and become instead "America," a power that has invaded Russia, watched on the Rhine, fought a war in Europe and lent money to everybody. This did not solve the "essential question for America," it merely suspended it, giving to unrestricted immigration, to political graft and corruption, to the unwieldy constitution and the arbitrary power of wealth, to individualism and indiscipline and under-education, an even fiercer importance. "The essential question for America, as for Europe," he summed it up, "is the rescue of her land, her public services, and the whole of her great economic processes from the anarchic and irresponsible control of private owners . . . and the organization of her social life upon the broad, clean, humane conceptions of modern science."

But did these socialist engineering conceptions, broad, clean and humane as they are, go to the root of the future in America? Is the rationalism, of which Mr. Wells has been so incisive an exponent, really so adequate as he thought? One leaves the book with the feeling that its ideas are in the main, part of our higher journalism, our nobler propaganda. But there remains much. There remains the brilliant observation, the suggestive synthesis and the genuine sympathies. No social or political engineering, after all, can work without the radiant generosity that Wells himself shows in his chapters on child-labor, on MacQueen, on the Tragedy of Color.

FRANCIS HACKETT.

Workers' Education

Workers' Education in the United States. Report of the Proceedings of the First Conference on Workers' Education in the United States. New York: Workers' Education Bureau, 465 West 23rd Street. Fifty cents.

ON April 2nd and 3rd, 1921, there was held at the New School for Social Research the first general conference on workers' education ever convened in the United States. It was no perfunctory or showy affair. It was not a dreary excuse for a few people to dine away from home. It was not attended by the vain and insistent seeker after the limelight. It was composed of men and women of standing in the world of organized labor, teachers who had actually conducted classes, and students fresh from their books and papers. They came as the representatives of trade union "colleges" from various parts of the country. Their purpose was to relate their own experience, to profit from the experience of others, and to create a permanent organization for mutual aid.

The papers and addresses before us are marked by the absence of after-dinner oratory. They are above all practical and informative. Here in simple language we are told how the various institutions were formed, financed, and conducted. Here we can find what courses were given, how teachers were secured, how classes were recruited, what methods of instruction were employed, and what obstacles had to be overcome. This is a very real and human document—one of the most important in the history of education in America.

The pages of the Proceedings are so packed with substance that no brief review can do it justice. Only a few specially significant features can be pointed out. The first is the demonstration of genuine interest on the part of many men and women of responsible positions in organized labor. It is a matter for comment that Mr. Gompers has given his consent to the publication of a recent article from his pen as an introduction to the volume. It is also to be noted that in this introduction he declares the American Federation of Labor to be "fully alive to the significance of the educational work which has recently grown up under trade union auspices." There is also a note of prophecy in his concluding sentence: "It may very well be that organized labor, which took such an important part in the establishment of popular education in the United States, will now take the lead in another movement of vital significance to the cultural development of this country."

A second striking feature is the variety of experiments which have been conducted under the head of labor education, ranging from colleges wholly independent and even at odds with established educational institutions to colleges closely cooperating with public and private agencies. From one centre comes the report that the city school authorities gladly lent classrooms and furnished one or more teachers, while from another comes a story of how the board of education would only admit classes to public buildings on condition that it was to select or approve the teachers.

A third outstanding revelation of the report is the proof that there are now in the United States a considerable number of socially minded teachers in colleges and public schools, who have the spirit and the equipment so necessary to good work in the labor education field. It appears that trade unions have not been half as dogmatic as some college trustees about guaranteeing the one hundred per cent "soundness" of their classroom leaders. Organized labor does not welcome intellectual prigs who come to "tell the students all about it," but it frankly accepts a variety of educational opinions. In the field of study and research, it is evidently possible for many people of many views, honestly held, to cooperate with perfect accord. The aim of labor education here revealed is to bring such poor dim light as the human mind can kindle to bear upon common problems. Therefore catholicity is the keynote of the new movement. That augurs well for the future.

Ardent youths will doubtless be disappointed on finding how relatively small is the number of those who take an interest in labor education. The enrolment of only a few thousand students out of several millions in the ranks of labor seems, at first thought, to be a poor showing. Those who remember, however, that these are the beginnings, made against many obstacles, will feel in a mood for rejoicing. As English experience shows it is the able

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

young members who take the trouble to inform themselves about labor and social problems, who rise to positions of leadership and influence in their respective unions. Labor education will not and ought not to rival the Chautauqua movement. It is too serious and too fundamental. It is better to build slowly and solidly, in the face of many discouragements, than to have a brilliant flash in the pan.

Last but not least is the outcome of this conference—the organization of the Workers' Education Bureau and a permanent association. The function of the Bureau will be to encourage and aid in the establishment of new colleges, to assist those already in existence, and serve as an agency for focussing opinion and experience in the field of labor education. If rightly managed and adequately supported, this beginning may grow into the most powerful adult educational movement in the world. Its potentialities are simply immeasurable.

CHARLES A. BEARD.

Two Books on London

A London Mosaic, by W. L. George; pictures by Philippe Forbes-Robertson. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co. $4.00.

London of the Future, by The London Society; Sir Aston Webb, editor. New York: E. P. Dutton. $15.00. illustrated.

THE city, and especially the metropolis, occupies a place in European literature which has no parallel in America. The student who wishes to investigate the history, the present life, and the probable development of London is confronted by a mass of material whose bibliography would run into hundreds of pages, and stretch all the way from Mr. E. V. Lucas's pious literary rambles to the twelve ponderous volumes of Mr. Charles Booth's Survey of the Life and Labour of the People of London. With this huge literature confronting the inquirer, and with each street and alley like the crowded gallery of a museum, it is perhaps as well to begin with the obvious; and the obvious at the present moment is Mr. W. L. George.

What are the peepholes through which Mr. George, a confessed lover of London, catches glimpses of his mistress? The chapter headings disclose a good deal; namely, Playgrounds, The Friendly Bowl, Wanderers, Soups and Stews, In Search of Vice, The Poor, Stones, Café Royal. This is of course by no means all of London, and it is only fair to Mr. George to admit that he crowds many specimens into these showcases which would never be admitted by any stringent classification; in which he resembles, perhaps, the sprawling, unexpected, hit-or-miss city that he essays to describe.

The American reader who has not visited London will be a little misled by Mr. Philippe Forbes-Robertson's illustrations. His Cromwell Road, for example, presents a pleasing aspect which compares well with any street vista we have in America, whereas in reality it is a rampart of drudging respectability, on a par exactly with the interminable rows of brownstone fronts on the upper west side of New York that are now only beginning to be eaten into by the skyscraper apartment. In trying to convey London to the stranger one thinks of flavors rather than of forms; and one must not demand too much of the artist. When all is said and done, the drenching individuality of London—a slattern on a throne—penetrates every description of the city, from Dickens to Whitten; and not even the coal tar exotic of Mr. W. L. George's personality can prevent some of the characteristic fragrances of London, vile though their origin may be, from reaching the reader's nose.

The chapter on Stones, with its humanitarian criticism of the Zoo, is good; and in this chapter one gets glimpses of the restless, moving metropolis, groping from the dungeon of Victorian Pimlico into the artificial daylight of Streatham and Golder's Green. Americans whose eyes are closed to their own cities might well open them by looking at London; and since Mr. George, at his worst, taxes no one's mentality, and at his best is sometimes penetrating and amusing, A London Mosaic can be cordially recommended, after Mr. Ford Madox Hueffer's The Soul of London, to do the trick. Such books have been lacking in America, where the literature of cities is either confined to serious political, economic and historic discussions or else belongs to the realty gambler's prospectus.

The symposium on London of the Future, which appears under the aegis of The London Society, belongs to an entirely different department from Mr. George's work; but the publication of both books gives evidence of the rich intellectual background upon which any future developments of the imperial metropolis will be embroidered. This weighty volume has, of course, the defects of all symposiums in the sketchiness of the individual article, in the overlapping of several parts, and the incoherence of the whole; and while something like a London Society policy emerges, it lacks the definiteness of a more closely knit work. At the same time the contributors exhibit severally a grasp of the problems, and a vigor of imagination which is more than noteworthy when one takes into account the sense of responsibility which men like, for instance, Mr. Raymond Unwin, Chief Inspector for the Ministry of Health, and the Viscount Devonport, Chairman of the Port of London Authority, must feel. Many of the immediate problems of London's development, such as the removal of the eyesore known as the Charing Cross Bridge and Station, are too local to have any application in America; but the treatment of transportation, playgrounds, recreation, housing and so forth is not without its lessons for us, even when American examples are held up for imitation. American cities which have been blithely fostering tenement house construction, in imitation of New York, would do well to heed Mr. Unwin's insistent demonstration of the economic, social and hygienic utility of the garden city development; and those cities which are making plans for populations reckoned in millions might consider his advice on the limitation of the size of cities.

The metropolis of the future, as these British architects, townplanners, and industrialists view it, will be a central administrative district, devoted to business and government, concentrated perhaps as much as the downtown section of New York. This central district will be surrounded by a residential area, limited in size and in density of population; around the city proper will be a ring of parkland, to supplement the squares, playgrounds, and newly laid out roof-gardens; and beyond this ring will cluster a group of satellite cities and villages, set more or less in the countryside, and planned as independent units which will make no attempt to coalesce with, or to imitate in size and character the central district.

Set forth in skinny outline, with no attempt, such as Professor Patrick Geddes made in his Cities in Evolution, to take some account of the accompanying changes in art

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and domesticity and social life, the city of the future does not present any very stirring colors to the imagination. This brings to the front the chief weakness of such a book as London of the Future, for like so many of our American reports on city plan, it concentrates too intently on mechanical details, which are necessary, and forgets about the social and cultural transformations, which are also necessary.

The changes for which the modern city planners and city developers are working call for the expression of new values in social life. The slums of our cities, the distracted competition of commercial organizations for advertising sites, the incomplete development of civic centres, and the spotty manner in which such important institutions as theaters, restaurants, moving picture houses and churches are set down, are all by-products of a wretched social order in which success is measured in terms of money, enjoyment in the capacity to spend money, and the sum total of the good life in the ability to leave money to one's heirs and assigns.

To make our cities over it is necessary not merely to plan for transformation, although this is a first step, for, as the Freudians show us, the wish is father to the deed. It is likewise needful, in the light of our plans, to change such arrangements in the social order as interfere with their fulfillment. To plan for a better city, and for a more effective adjustment of the city to its region, is perhaps the shrewdest move toward giving the abstract proposals for alterations in the tenure of land, the possession of the industrial community's usufruct, and so forth, the consistent drive—beyond the fitful reaction of resentment—which they need to carry them through. Some of the guild socialists in England, notably Mr. G. D. H. Cole, appear to have grasped this fact. They see that this interest in the development and reconstruction of the city is no diversion from the business of effective revolution but one of the conditions of its actual performance. Wouldn't it be interesting if the Rotary Clubs and the Chambers of Commerce, with their plans for Bigger and Better Boomtown should find themselves outflanked by a proletarian movement upon Main Street? This is a dream of course; but so for that matter is Boomtown.

LEWIS MUMFORD.

Space, Time and Deity

Space, Time and Deity: the Gifford Lectures at Glasgow, 1916-18, by S. Alexander, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Manchester. New York: The Macmillan Co. $14.00.

PROFESSOR ALEXANDER'S book, the publication of which has been eagerly awaited by all students of philosophy who are interested in the development of modern realism, is not only on a grand scale—nearly eight hundred pages of close argument—but it is done in the grand manner. Hitherto realism, whether in England or in America, has been little more than a point of view, definite enough no doubt in principle, yet exploited rather in polemics against current idealism than fortified and tested by systematic and comprehensive construction. But what Professor E. G. Spaulding's New Rationalism has tried to do for the American type of realism, that has now been done for the English type, and in a vastly more impressive manner, by Professor Alexander's Space, Time and Deity. Here we have a metaphysical treatise which realists can confidently match against such masterpieces of idealism as Bradley's Appearance and Reality or Bosanquet's Principle of Individuality and Value. It is an achievement of such quality and power as to rank its author among the giants of present-day thought.

To give, within the short space of a review, any adequate impression of an argument in which empirical details are so skilfully wrought into the pattern of a world-embracing vision, is quite impossible. It must suffice to single out the most salient points.

First, then, Mr. Alexander is a good realist. "The presence of mind is not a condition of the existence or quality of things. All they owe to mind is their being known." Mind is not, as for idealists, the ultimate ground of things. It is merely one empirical existent among others, more perfect than some, but not more real, still less the source of all reality. Time, space, motion, matter precisely as they are conceived by physicists and chemists, have their place in Mr. Alexander's universe alongside of color and sound, life and consciousness. It is a "democratic" universe in which every kind of thing is the equal of every other in respect of reality. Indeed, so far as any universal and ultimate description of the universe is possible, it must be given in terms of space-time or motion, not of mind. "Space-time is the stuff of which all existence is composed." It is the matrix from which the whole realm of empirically different kinds of things has evolved.

This brings us, secondly, to what is the central core of Mr. Alexander's theory. His universe is a universe in evolution, a universe in travail towards perfection. If space-time is the initial and ultimate stuff of which it is made, Deity is the goal, so far as we can envisage and name it, towards which it is growing and straining. By Deity Mr. Alexander means, not a personal God, but Divine Quality—a higher quality of perfection than any at present empirically realized. The being, or beings, who, when they shall have come into existence, will possess this quality, will be God or gods. But there is no God as yet. There is only what we call religion—"the sentiment in us that we are caught in the movement of the world to a higher level of existence." So far, mind or consciousness is the highest level actually achieved by evolution. Looking back we can trace, roughly, the path which evolution has traversed from pure space-time or motion via matter (as mechanical), secondary qualities, life to mind. Looking forward, we discern Deity as the next level about to emerge. With Bergson, Mr. Alexander thus holds to the reality of time as "creative" and as the inexhaustible source of "novelties," but, unlike Bergson, he does not regard life as the ultimate reality and matter as the deposit of the life-impulse where it slackens, but treats both matter and life as stages in the evolutionary process, each emerging as a definite novelty and marking a fresh level in the ascent towards perfection. At the same time, each lower level persists and is carried up into the next higher as the condition of the latter's existence. Thus life rests on physico-chemical processes, and consciousness, in turn, requires for its emergence a living body with an appropriate neural organization.

But, thirdly, most interesting, and, it must be confessed, in a realistic context most unexpected and curious, is what Mr. Alexander says about minds. All through the first volume they hardly appear on the stage at all. They stand in a corner as silent supers, while a formid-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE PLAYS OF EDMOND ROSTAND

Translated by Henderson Daingerfield Norman
With 8 full page illustrations by Ivan Glidden

Exquisite translations of Rostand's famous plays following the original poetic form. Mrs. Norman has preserved the sprightliness and charm of the original French wit in the happiest manner. 2 vols. $10.50

BEGGARS' GOLD

By Ernest Poole

"We are all beggars sitting on bags of gold." $2.00

A DAUGHTER OF THE MIDDLE BORDER

By Hamlin Garland

An autobiographic record of deep social significance, detailing the intimate social life of Midland America during the most interesting period of its history. A continuation of *A Son of the Middle Border*. Ill. $2.00

EUDOCIA
By **Eden Phillpotts**

A romance of Byzantium, centering around the Empress Eudocia with all the color and warmth of that ancient civilization. $2.00

FOUR PLAYS FOR DANCERS
By **William Butler Yeats**

Ill. by *Edmond Dulac;* music by *Edmond Dulac* and *Walter Morse Rummel.*
Four poetic dramas designed to be produced with masks and music on any strip of stage. $2.00

CITY HOMES ON COUNTRY LANES
By **William E. Smythe**

An enthusiastic presentation of the benefits of living on the land with suggestions for farming communities and "garden cities." $2.50

THE SCHOOLMASTER AND OTHER STORIES
By **Anton Chekhov**

A new volume of Chekhov's matchless stories bearing witness to his unflinching yet sensitive pen. $2.25

KING COLE
By **John Masefield**

Ill. by his daughter, *Judith Masefield.*
A beautiful drama of old England in which King Cole personifies humanity's undying quest for the ideal. $1.50

THE GLANDS REGULATING PERSONALITY
By **Louis Berman, M.D.**

A discussion based on recent physiological and psychological research showing how man's individuality is controlled by his glands. $3.50

Two New Books on International Questions

JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE
By **Henry W. Taft**

An open-minded consideration of the case of Japan and the Pacific, with a plea for a definite and consistent policy regarding Eastern affairs. $1.00

THE ABC'S OF DISARMAMENT AND THE PACIFIC PROBLEMS
By **Arthur Bullard**

A searching up-to-the-minute analysis of the vital interests of the nations with suggestions as to how these interests may be reconciled. $1.25

FOR SALE AT ALL BOOKSTORES OR FROM

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

64-66 Fifth Avenue **New York**

Please mention The New Republic when writing to advertisers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

able array of metaphysical entities, space-time and an attendant host of categories, strut before the foot-lights. But in the second volume, the rôles are reversed, and the burden of the play falls increasingly upon minds. It is now found that the simple realistic way of analyzing knowledge as a "cognitive relation" in which an "independent" object presents itself, just as it is, to a contemplating mind, is altogether too simple. It turns out that even in correct perception and thought, it depends very much more on the mind than on the independent reality just how much or little of it the mind apprehends, in short, just what the object presenting itself in the cognitive relation then and there actually is. And when it comes to illusion and error, the mind's share is more painfully obvious still: "illusory appearances have their source in the mind itself." This statement is barely squared with realism by adding to it this other: "illusions are the real world seen awry or squintingly." Naughty minds thus to "interfere"! If only they would keep still and let the real world present itself as it really is! Fortunately, so Mr. Alexander holds, minds can protect themselves against such lapses by cooperation and thus achieve truth as a product of "collective thinking."

And here we come to the second, and more creditable, function of minds in the universe. If by their defects they are the source of illusion and error, on the other hand they are also indispensable to the occurrence of values, of truth, beauty, goodness. For these "tertiary qualities" are not, for Mr. Alexander, new and higher levels of evolution, but arise from the "amalgamation of the object with the human appreciation of it." They can be described only in terms mentioning both the subject and the object. Truth is not a quality of propositions in themselves, but only of propositions believed and asserted by a mind. A rose is red whether anyone sees it or not, but it is beautiful only when a mind feels its beauty. And no object is good except as satisfying a conscious person.

All these and many other things are set forth in these volumes with abundant learning and a sweep of imagination rivalled by few contemporary thinkers. Withal the thinking is everywhere "from the life"—done at first hand, not sustaining itself parasitically upon the thinking of others. And through it all runs that sweet and ripe humanity which endears Mr. Alexander to all who know him.

R. F. A. HOERNLÉ.

Contributors

JOHN DEWEY, professor of philosophy at Columbia University, has recently returned from China.

GARET GARRETT is the author of Where the Money Grows and An Empire Beleaguered. He has written financial articles for the New York Evening Post, the New York Times and the New York Sun.

LAWRENCE GILMAN, the musical critic and essayist, is the author of The Music of Tomorrow, Aspects of Modern Opera, Nature in Music and numerous other volumes.

CHARLES A. BEARD is the author of An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution, Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy and A History of the American People.

LEWIS MUMFORD has been associate editor of the Dial and acting editor of the London Sociological Review.

R. F. A. HOERNLE is a professor at Armstrong College, Newcastle-on-Tyne, England.

OXFORD BOOKS

A Heritage of Earnestness

IN OXFORD BOOKS *many men have stored all that they knew, or through long years have gained, of knowledge, of wisdom, and of beauty.*

MARY, QUEEN OF SCOTS
By ADA STERLING *Net* $1.25
The story of Mary Stuart is one of supreme interest and Miss Sterling's drama creates an unusually vivid picture of her life.

ENGLISH METRISTS
By T. S. OMOND $4.75
An examination of English prosodical criticism from Elizabethan times to the present day, with valuable bibliographies.

THE WAYS OF LIFE
By STEPHEN WARD *Net* $2.00
A study in ethics dealing with the whole of life, admirably written, and original in many of its conclusions.

ESSAYS ON VOCATION
Edited by BASIL MATHEWS *Net* $1.75
A second series of these stimulating essays dealing with literature, theology, missionary service, and work in foreign lands as fields for a life's work.

MILTON'S PROSODY
By ROBERT BRIDGES $5.65
Mr. Bridge's final word on this subject. Various chapters are devoted to Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained, Samson Agonistes, Obsolete Mannerisms and Accentual Verse.

COURAGE IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS
By COVENTRY PATMORE *Net* $3.75
Some forty essays, now collected for the first time, the basis being Patmore's own copies of articles intended for reprinting.

A BOOK VERSE FROM LANGLAND TO KIPLING
By J. C. SMITH $1.60
Palgrave's *Golden Treasury* is a collection of lyrics, but there are many non-lyrical poems in English that readers will enjoy equally with those in *Golden Treasury*. The present volume is composed almost entirely of these.

THE COURT PAINTERS OF THE GRAND MOGULS
By LAURENCE BINYON $37.80
A remarkable work on a little known phase of Indian art, illustrated with splendid coloured plates of choice examples.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW
By JOHN EUGENE HARLEY *Net* $3.00
An authoritative treatment of international policy in its most highly developed stage.

THE IDEA OF COVENTRY PATMORE
By OSBERT BURDETTE *Net* $3.75
A successful attempt to present the substance and philosophy of Coventry Patmore's poetry.

At all booksellers or from the publishers.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
AMERICAN BRANCH
35 WEST 32ND STREET, NEW YORK

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED